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ANY significant legislative and case law developments in Texas
partnership, corporation, and securities law occurred during the
current annual Survey period. The enactment of the Texas Re-
vised Limited Partnership Act (TRLPA)' and the enactment of director lia-
bility limitation and indemnification amendments to the Texas Business
Corporation Act (TBCA) highlighted the legislative developments. 2 Several




The most significant partnership law development during the Survey pe-
riod was the Texas Legislature's enactment of the Texas Revised Limited
Partnership Act.3 TRLPA, the product of a multi-year project of the Part-
nership Law Committee of the State Bar of Texas,4 renovated, modernized,
and replaced the Texas Uniform Limited Partnership Act (TULPA), which
had served as the law in Texas since 1955. 5 Enacted primarily in response to
the creative and greatly expanded use of limited partnerships in the real es-
tate and oil and gas industries, TRLPA combines flexibility and limited part-
ner protection to the advantage of both promoters of and investors in these
* B.S., Pennsylvania State University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney
at Law, Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C., Dallas, Texas. The author wishes to thank Michelle D.
Chadwick, Esq. of Dallas, Texas, for her editorial assistance and Professor Alan R. Bromberg
of Dallas, Texas for his insightful comments on drafts of this Article.
1. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
2. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02-1 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
3. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
4. The Committee members who worked on TRLPA were Steven A. Waters, Chairman,
Professor Alan R. Bromberg, Paul W. Buchschacher, Carol C. Clark, John E. Gangstad, Pro-
fessor Robert W. Hamilton, R. Clarke Heidrick, Jr., Jonathan M. Hornblower, Eugene W.
Albert, T. Franklin Meyers, David H. Oden, Sally A. Schreiber, Michael K. Pierce, T. Hardie,
W. Thomas Weir, W. Alan Kailer, and this author.
5. TULPA was based on the 1916 version of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act,
which was designed to address simple business structures. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 6132a-1 introductory comment (Vernon Supp. 1988). TULPA proved unable to accom-
modate adequately the creative and complex uses of limited partnerships as syndication vehi-
cles for the exploitation of the federal income tax benefits offered to limited partnerships. Id.
For additional background of TULPA and a useful analysis of its major changes, see Albert &
Schwartz, Texas Revised Limited Partnership Act, 50 TEX. B.J. 148-53 (1987).
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prominent Texas industries. 6 TRLPA also borrows several concepts from
Texas corporate law that further enhance TRLPA's usefulness. 7 In general,
TRLPA deemphasizes the role of the certificate of limited partnership filed
with the secretary of state, increases the importance of the partnership agree-
ment in establishing the relationships among partners, and eliminates ques-
tions concerning interpretation of pre-TRLPA concepts that have become
anachronisms or were susceptible to multiple interpretations. 8
1. Effective Date. TRLPA became effective on September 1, 1987, and
governs (i) all limited partnerships formed on or subsequent to the effective
date,9 and (ii) all foreign limited partnerships that transact business in
Texas, but have not qualified to do so prior to the effective date.' 0 Impor-
tantly, TRLPA contains a transitional rule that provides that domestic lim-
ited partnerships formed prior to the effective date and foreign limited
partnerships that qualified to transact business in Texas prior to the effective
date need not comply with TRLPA until September 1, 1992.11 These lim-
ited partnerships, however, may elect to have the provisions of TRLPA gov-
ern them by filing a certificate of amendment indicating such an election
with the secretary of state and conforming their certificates of limited part-
nership (in the case of domestic limited partnerships) or applications for re-
gistration as a foreign limited partnership (in the case of foreign limited
6. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1 introductory comment (Vernon Supp.
1988). TRLPA's overriding objectives are flexibility and limited partner protection, although
like most revised statutes TRLPA also aims at modernization, clarification, coherence, and
comprehensiveness. Id.
Flexibility is to give partners and drafters of their agreements wide leeway to
create structures and relationships tailored to their financial, control, tax and
other desires. Flexibility is achieved largely through an enhanced role for the
partnership agreement, discussed below. A number of rigid features of prior law
are eliminated, e.g., the requirement of unanimous votes of limited partners for
certain actions, the prohibition on services rendered as a limited partner's con-
tributions, and the requirement that all limited partners, their residence ad-
dresses and their contributione and profit shares be listed in the certificate filed
with the Secretary of State.
Limited partner protection is to give limited partners a better opportunity to
protect their investment by monitoring the general partner(s) management, by
having veto power over various actions of the general partner(s), and by partici-
pating (to an extent) in the control of the partnership, all without sacrificing
their own limited liability. (See Sec. 3.03 and its comment.) A limited partner
who is also a lender to the partnership may take a security interest in partner-
ship property (Sec. 1.10). For the first time, the right of a limited partner to
bring a derivative suit on behalf of the partnership, e.g., against a general part-
ner for mismanagement or fiduciary breach, is recognized by statute (Art. 10).
Id.
7. Among the corporate law concepts first found in TRLPA are (i) reservation of name
prior to the time of formation, id. § 1.04(b); (ii) maintenance of a registered office and regis-
tered agent in Texas, id. § i .06(l)-(2); (iii) provisions for service of process, id. § 2.11; (iv) form
of initial contributions by limited partners, id. § 1.07(a)(4)(A); (v) classes of partnership inter-
ests, id. § 1.07(a)(1)(D); (vi) mergers and consolidations, id. § 2.11; (vii) derivative lawsuits, id.
§§ 10.01-.05.
8. See id. introductory comment.
9. Id. § 13.02(a)(1).
10. Id. § 13.02(a)(2).
11. Id. § 13.02(a)(3).
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partnerships) to meet the requirements imposed by TRLPA.12 It is expected
that many preexisting partnerships will make the election in order to obtain
the advantages offered by TRLPA.13
2. Role of Partnership Agreement. As noted above, a primary goal of
TRLPA was to permit contractual flexibility among the partners of a limited
partnership. TRLPA achieves this goal by building three grades of contrac-
tual control into the statute.14 The first grade covers matters that are speci-
fied either to be governed by "the partnership agreement"' 15 or to be
governed by the statute "unless otherwise provided in the partnership agree-
ment."1 6 While the partnership agreement in these instances may be written
or oral and need not be formal, the statute will control only in the absence of
such an agreement. 17 The second grade covers several important matters
that may be governed contractually only by a written agreement; otherwise
the statute controls. 18 The third grade covers matters that are specified to be
governed by the statute and do not provide the "unless otherwise provided in
the partnership agreement" option. 19 The statute implicitly controls in these
cases even if the partners have reached a contrary agreement. 20
3. Formation of a Limited Partnership. A major shortcoming of TULPA
was its requirement that the certificate of limited partnership set forth a
large amount of information concerning the limited partnership and its part-
ners. For example, TULPA required that the certificate of limited partner-
ship specify the name and residence of each limited partner, as well as the
particulars of contributions that the limited partners might have made or
agreed to make in the future. 21 TULPA also was cumbersome in that any
change in the information set forth in the certificate of limited partnership
required the limited partnership to file an amendment to reflect such
change. 22 Compounding these difficulties was TULPA's general require-
ment that each limited partner sign and swear to the initial certificate of
12. Id. § 13.02(c).
13. Id. introductory comment.
14. Id.; see also id. § 1.02 comment (definition of partnership agreement).
15. Id.; see, e.g., id. § 3.01(b) (admission of new limited partners) and § 4.03(a) (rights
and restrictions of a general partner).
16. Id. introductory comment; see, e.g., id. § 5.02(b) (enforceability of promised contribu-
tions by limited partners), § 5.02(d) (release of obligations to make contributions or return
improper distributions), § 7.02(a)(1) (assignability of partnership interests), and § 7.02(a)(2)
(nondissolution by assignment of an interest).
17. Id. introductory comment.
18. Id.; see, e.g., id. § 3.02 (creation of classes or groups of general partners with different
rights), § 4.0 1(a) (admission of additional general partners after formation of the partnership),
§ 4.05 (creation of classes or groups of limited partners with different rights), § 5.04 (sharing of
distributions), § 6.03 (withdrawal rights of limited partners), and § 11.02 (indemnification of a
general partner).
19. Id. introductory comment; see, e.g., id. § 6.02(a) (general partner's power to withdraw
at any time), and § 10.01 (limited partner's right to bring a derivative suit).
20. Id. introductory comment.
21. Id. art. 6132a, § 3(a)(1) (Vernon 1970).
22. Id. §§ 3(a)(l), 26(a)(2).
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limited partnership and each amendment thereto.23 As a consequence,
many limited partnerships, particularly publicly traded master limited part-
nerships with hundreds or thousands of limited partners, found these initial
filing and amendment requirements unduly burdensome and chose to organ-
ize themselves in states other than Texas.24
TRLPA responded to the shortcomings of TULPA by fundamentally
changing the nature of the certificate of limited partnership from a detailed
disclosure document to merely a basic notice filing. 25 Under TRLPA, the
certificate of limited partnership need set forth only the following matters:
(i) the limited partnership's name, (ii) its registered office address, (iii) its
registered agent and the address thereof for service of process, (iv) the ad-
dress of the location at which the limited partnership keeps its records for
inspection purposes, and (v) each general partner's name, mailing address
and street address.26 This streamlining of the certificate of limited partner-
ship requirements acknowledges the reality that persons evaluating whether
to extend credit or otherwise deal with a limited partnership seldom rely
solely on a certificate of limited partnership in order to determine whether to
do business with the entity.27 To obtain facts concerning the capital and
finances of the partnership and other pertinent matters, persons dealing with
the limited partnership instead, as they should have under TULPA, must
examine the partnership agreement together with other information that the
limited partnership provides them.28 In this regard, the expanded require-
ment of a written partnership agreement and the obligation to keep partner-
ship records (as described below) are expected to benefit persons dealing
with the partnership in these efforts to evaluate the financial viability of the
limited partnership.29
Furthermore, TRLPA simplified the process of forming a limited partner-
ship and amending the certificate of limited partnership by eliminating
TULPA's requirement that every partner, whether general or limited, sign
the initial certificate of limited partnership and every amendment thereto.30
Under TRLPA, only the general partners must sign the initial certificate and
only one general partner's signature is necessary to effect an amendment of
the certificate. 31 Furthermore, although TRLPA carries over the TULPA
provision that each person who signs a certificate of limited partnership or
certificate of amendment does so under oath subject to penalties of perjury,
TRLPA does not require that the signatures be acknowledged by a notary
23. Id. § 3(a)(1).
24. See generally TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1 introductory comment
(Vernon Supp. 1988).
25. Id. § 2.01(a) comment.
26. Id. § 2.01(a).
27. Id. § 2.01(a) comment.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. § 2.01(a) and comment.
31. Id. § 2.04.
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TRLPA also clarifies prior law regarding the time at which a limited part-
nership is deemed formed. TULPA considered the limited partnership
formed when there had been substantial compliance in good faith with the
certificate, filing, and fee requirements of the statute.33 In instances where
the parties filed no certificate, however, the substantial compliance test was
troublesome and unpredictable. TRLPA established a bright line test in this
regard by providing that a limited partnership cannot be formed unless and
until the general partners have filed the certificate of limited partnership, and
then, only if the entity complies substantially with the requirements of for-
mation. 34 In addition, TRLPA goes beyond TULPA by deeming limited
partners to be admitted to the limited partnership upon the latter of (i) the
formation date of the limited partnership, or (ii) the admission date stated in
the records of the limited partnership (or if the records state no such date,
then on the date that the person's admission is first reflected in the records of
the limited partnership). 3"
4. Fees. In a further effort to simplify the formation process, the legislature
changed the fee for filing an initial certificate of limited partnership. 36
TULPA had provided for a sliding-scale fee structure of one-half of one per-
cent (1/2%) of the total limited partner contributions, with minimum filing
fee of $100 and a maximum filing fee of $2,500. 37 TRLPA requires a flat fee
of $750 for filing an initial certificate of limited partnership. 38
5. Name. Under TULPA, the name of the limited partnership could not
contain the surname of a limited partner unless a general partner had the
same surname. 39 TRLPA is more liberal than TULPA in this regard in that
it permits a limited partnership's name to include a limited partner's name if
the limited partnership operated under the name before the limited partner
joined the partnership.40 However, TRLPA also is slightly more restrictive
than TULPA in that it imposes the additional requirements that the name
must contain the words "Limited Partnership," "Limited," or the abbrevia-
32. Id. TRLPA also includes provisions regarding execution by attorney-in-fact and exe-
cution by judicial order. Id. §§ 2.04(b), 2.05.
33. Id. § 3(b).
34. Id § 2.01(b). It should be noted that this provision was not intended to change ex-
isting case law such as Garrett v. Koepke, 569 S.W.2d 568, 570-71 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985,
writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Shindler v. Marr & Assocs., 695 S.W.2d 699, 703 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.), that may shield putative limited partners with limited liabil-
ity when there has been a defective filing of (or failure to file) a certificate of limited partner-
ship; however, TRLPA § 3.04 now deals with such a situation in detail. TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1, § 2.01(b) comment (Vernon Supp. 1988).
35. Id. § 3.01(a).
36. Id § 12.01(c).
37. Id. art. 6132a, § 3(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
38. Id. art. 6132a-1, § 12.01. The fee for filing a certificate of amendment, a certificate of
cancellation, a restated certificate of limited partnership, or a correction certificate is $250. Id.
39. Id. art. 6132a, § 6(a) (Vernon 1970).
40. Id art. 6132a-1, § 1.03(1)(B) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
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tion "L.P." or "Ltd." as its last words or letters.4 1 Furthermore, the name
of the limited partnership (i) cannot contain a word or phrase that indicates
or implies that the entity is a corporation or that it is organized other than
for a purpose stated in its partnership agreement; 42 and (ii) cannot be the
same or deceptively similar to the name of a corporation or limited partner-
ship that exists under the laws of Texas or, unless a written consent has been
obtained, a name that has been reserved or registered for a corporation or
limited partnership. 43
6. Reservation of Name. One of the many corporate law concepts that
TRLPA adopted to fill a void in TULPA is a reservation of name provi-
sion.44 TRLPA permits the reservation of a limited partnership name for
successive 120-day periods, without an intervening waiting period. 45
TRLPA also allows a foreign limited partnership not currently authorized to
do business in Texas to register its name and thereby prevent others from
forming or registering a limited partnership with the same name in Texas. 46
7. Registered Office; Registered Agent; Service of Process. TRLPA also bor-
rowed the corporate law concepts of a registered office and a registered agent
to fill a void in TRLPA.47 TRLPA requires that domestic, as well as for-
eign, limited partnerships subject to TRLPA maintain within the state a reg-
istered office and a registered agent for purposes of service of process. 48
Service of process, notice, or demand on either a general partner of the lim-
ited partnership or the registered agent of the limited partnership constitutes
effective service on the limited partnership under TRLPA.49
8. Liability for False Statements in the Certificate. TRLPA has modified
prior law concerning false statements in the certificate in several ways to
afford limited partners additional protection and to clarify the specific events
that give rise to liability based on such statements. Under TULPA, any gen-
eral or limited partner who signed a certificate of limited partnership that
the partner knew contained a false statement at the time of filing exposed
itself to liability to any person who relied on the false statement.50 Similarly,
if the partner learned of such a false statement and had sufficient time to
amend the certificate before a party relied on the misstatement, the partner
41. Id. § 1.03.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. § 1.04; cf TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. art. 2.06 (Vernon 1980).
45. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1, § 1.04 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
46. Id. § 1.05.
47. Id.; cf TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. arts. 2.07, 2.08 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1988).
48. TRLPA has provisions for the change of registered office, registered agent, and filing a
prescribed statement with the secretary of state. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1,
§ 1.06(b)(h) (Vernon Supp. 1988). Provisions are included for the resignation of a registered
agent. Id. § 1.06(f).
49. Id. § 1.04; cf TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.06 (Vernon 1980).
50. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 7 (Vernon 1970).
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could incur liability to any person who relied on the false statement.51
TRLPA offers a limited partner considerably more protection in this re-
gard than did TULPA. First, TRLPA has removed the requirement that
limited partners execute the initial certificate of limited partnership, or any
amendment thereto. 52 Accordingly, it will be rare that anyone other than a
general partner will face exposure to liability for a false statement in the
certificate of limited partnership. Second, TRLPA has adopted a materiality
standard for such false statements, which provides that no liability can at-
tach unless the certificate contains a material misstatement or there is a ma-
terial omission from the certificate.53 Third, TRLPA contains a safe harbor
provision that protects a partner who corrects a misstatement in or omission
from the certificate, or cancels the certificate, within 30 days after the part-
ner knew or should have known of the misstatement or omission. 54
9. Recordkeeping Requirements and Access of Limited Partners to Informa-
tion. Since the short-form certificate of limited partnership generally sets
forth only the identity of the general partners and matters respecting the
partnership itself, TRLPA requires that the partnership agreement or other
written partnership records must set forth many other important matters,
such as (i) a description of the contribution made by each partner, (ii) the
times at which additional contributions are to be made, (iii) the events re-
quiring the limited partnership to be dissolved and its affairs wound up,
(iv) the date on which each partner became a partner, and (v) correct and
complete books and records of account of the limited partnership. 55 The
partnership must keep the partnership agreement at its principal office.56 In
addition, a list of all partners and their addresses, class and ownership per-
centages, copies of the partnership agreement, the certificate of limited part-
nership, all amendments and restatements thereto, the limited partnership's
federal income tax returns for the past six tax years, and correct, complete
books and records of the limited partnership must be made available to a
partner upon request.57
10. Liability of Limited Partners. Limited partner protection is an overrid-
ing objective of TRLPA.58 Consistent with this objective, TRLPA exposes a
limited partner to personal liability only in those cases when the limited
partner agrees to be liable for such liability, or when equitable concepts of
estoppel and justified detrimental reliance by a creditor require the imposi-
tion of personal liability on a limited partner.59 TRLPA carries over
TULPA's general rule that the obligations of the limited partnership do not
51. Id.
52. Id. art. 6132a-1, § 2.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
53. Id. § 2.08(a).
54. Id. §§ 2.08(b), 2.08 comment.
55. Id. § 1.07(a).
56. Id. § 3.03.
57. Id.
58. Id. introductory comment.
59. Id. § 3.03.
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bind the limited partner,6° but preserves the traditional exception to this
general rule that a limited partner may incur personal liability if he or she
participates in the control of the business. 61 Under TULPA, this liability
extended only to persons transacting business with the limited partnership
who reasonably believed that the limited partner was a general partner.62 In
contrast, TRLPA provides limited partners additional protection by narrow-
ing the persons to whom liability extends to include only persons who trans-
act business with the limited partnership with actual knowledge of such
limited partner's participation in control.63 Additionally, TRLPA expands
the list of activities statutorily defined as not constituting taking part in con-
trol of the business to include a non-exclusive laundry list of additional activ-
ities, including: (i) acting as a partner of a partnership that is a general
partner of the limited partnership; (ii) indemnifying a general partner as per-
mitted under TRLPA; (iii) voting on the removal of a general partner; and
(iv) changing the scope of the limited partnership's business. 64
11. Person Erroneously Believing Himself or Herself to be a Limited Part-
ner. Not surprisingly, the situation frequently arises that a person has in-
vested in an enterprise with the expectation of becoming a limited partner in
the enterprise, but for some reason, either the enterprise did not become a
limited partnership or the person did not become a limited partner. This
situation creates the risk that the person might be held accountable as a
general partner. TULPA addressed this situation by providing that such a
person will not, by reason of his or her exercise of the rights of a limited
partner, be considered a general partner of the enterprise so long as the per-
son promptly renounced his or her interest in the profits of the enterprise
upon the ascertainment of the mistake.65 TRLPA expands TULPA in this
area by providing an investor a choice of alternatives when faced with this
situation.66 TRLPA generally provides that a person who erroneously, but
in good faith, believes that he or she has made a contribution to and has
become a limited partner in a limited partnership is not liable as a general
partner or otherwise obligated if, within a reasonable period of time after
ascertaining the mistake, the person either (i) withdraws from participation
in future profits of the enterprise by executing and filing a certificate declar-
ing his or her withdrawal; (ii) executes and files an appropriate certificate of
60. Id.; cf id. art. 6132a, § 8 (Vernon 1970).
61. Id. art. 6132a-1, § 3.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988). As a practical matter, this liability
extends only to a limited partner who has day-to-day control of the operations of the business
because of the extensive safe-harbor provisions. See id. § 3.03(b).
62. Id. art. 6132a, § 8(a) (Vernon 1970).
63. Id. art. 6132a-1, § 3.03 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
64. Id. § 3.03(a)(b). Furthermore, if the limited partnership is qualified as an investment
company under the Investment Company Act of 1940, then the limited partner's safe harbor
also extends to (i) electing directors or trustees of the investment company, (ii) approving or
terminating investment advisory or underwriting contracts, (iii) approving auditors; and
(iv) acting on any matters that the Investment Company Act of 1940 requires to be approved
by the holders of beneficial interests in the investment company. Id.
65. Id. art. 6132a, § 12 (Vernon 1970).
66. Id. art. 6132a-1, § 3.04 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
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limited partnership or amendment thereof; or (iii) executes and files a statu-
torily prescribed statement of status, known as "Filing Pursuant to Subdivi-
sion (2) of Subsection (a) of Section 3.04, Texas Revised Limited Partnership
Act."6
7
The statutorily prescribed statement of status allows an investor under
such circumstances time to rectify the problems regarding his or her status
in the enterprise without having to immediately renounce his or her interest
in the profits of the partnership. 68 The statement of status must contain
(i) the limited partnership's name, (ii) the name and mailing address of the
signer of the statement, (iii) a statement that the signer obtained an interest
in the limited partnership, (iv) a statement that the person has attempted to
cause a general partner to file an accurate certificate of limited partnership
and that the partner has not done so, and (v) a statement that the partner-
ship is filing a written statement of status in accordance with the statute and
that the person signing it claims status as a limited partner of the partner-
ship.69 The statement of status remains effective for 180 days.70 If the enter-
prise does not file the certificate of limited partnership or certificate of
amendment on or before the expiration of such period, the person filing the
statement has no further protection from liability and must, within ten days
after the expiration of the 180-day period, withdraw from participation in
future profits of the enterprise as described above or sue in court demanding
the execution and filing of the certificate of limited partnership or an appro-
priate amendment therein. 7'
Failure to comply with the provisions described above will result in the
investor being treated as a general partner for purposes of liability to third
parties transacting business with the partnership if (i) the investor knew or
should have known either that no certificate of limited partnership had been
filed or that the certificate of limited partnership inaccurately referred to the
investor as a general partner, and (ii) the third party both reasonably be-
lieved, based on the investor's conduct, that the person was a general partner
at the time of the transaction and extended credit to the enterprise in reason-
able reliance on the credit of the investor.72
12. Classes and Voting of Partners. TRLPA expressly provides that a lim-
ited partnership can establish classes of general and limited partners that
have different rights, powers, and duties, provided that these different classes
are set forth in a written partnership agreement. 73 Furthermore, TRLPA
permits the future creation of additional classes of partners with certain
rights, powers, and duties so long as the right of the limited partnership to
67. Id. § 3.04(a).
68. Id.
69. Id. § 3.04(a)(2).
70. Id. § 3.04(b).
71. Id. If an action is brought within the applicable period and is diligently prosecuted to
conclusion, the person bringing it continues to be protected from liability until the action is
finally decided adversely to that persons. Id.
72. Id. § 3.04(c).
73. Id. § 3.02.
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do so is set forth in a written partnership agreement. 74 The limited partner-
ship can express these rights by either establishing the rights in the partner-
ship agreement or describing the rights at the time of the formation of the
partnership. 75 Under TULPA, all limited partners as a class had equal
rights, powers, and duties, unless the certificate provided for one limited
partner having priority over another limited partner with respect to one or
more particular matters. 76 TRLPA generally provides limited partnerships
with the opportunity to utilize more flexible capitalization structures similar
to those afforded to Texas corporations. 77
13. Rights, Powers, and Liabilities of General Partners. TRLPA carries
over the TULPA concept that a general partner of a limited partnership has
the same liabilities to third persons as a partner in a general partnership.78
TRLPA, however, expressly permits limited partners to broaden or restrict a
general partner's rights and powers to bind the limited partnership with re-
spect to third parties and its rights, powers, and liabilities to the limited
partnership and the limited partners.79
14. Admission of Additional Partners. TULPA required that all limited
partners consent to the admission of a new general partner and provided that
the terms of the certificate of limited partnership controlled whether addi-
tional limited partners may become partners of the partnership.80 TRLPA
provides more flexibility concerning the admission of new or additional gen-
eral or limited partners by permitting the limited partnership to admit addi-
tional general partners and limited partners either by unanimous written
consent of the partners or by such other action as is provided in a written
partnership agreement, rather than the certificate of limited partnership.81
15. Contributions. TRLPA expands the permissible forms of contributions
by a limited partner to include not only cash and property8 2 but also past
services rendered to the partnership, notes, and other cash obligations.8 3
TRLPA overcomes a major deficiency of TULPA in this regard by expressly
authorizing many of the modern forms of financing (e.g., letters of credit and
negotiable paper) that limited partners frequently desire to utilize as their
contributions.8 4 TRLPA permits these expanded forms of contributions be-
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. art. 6132a, § 15 (Vernon 1970).
77. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 2.12, 2.13 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
78. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1, § 4.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
79. Id. § 4.03(a), (b); cf id art. 6132a, § 10(b) (Vernon 1970).
80. Id. art. 6132a, §§ 9, 10, 20(d) (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1988).
81. Id. art. 6132a-1, §§ 3.01, 4.01, 7.04(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
82. TULPA provided that the contributions of a limited partner could be cash or other
property, but not services. Id. art. 6132a, § 5 (Vernon 1970).
83. Id. art. 6132a-1, § 5.01 (Vernon Supp. 1988). Interestingly, TRLPA is broader than
TBCA in this regard. See TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. art. 2.16(A) (Vernon 1980). TBCA
prohibits promissory notes as consideration for the issuance of corporate shares. Id. art.
2.16(B) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
84. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1, § 5.01 comment (Vernon Supp. 1988). The
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cause they are as capable of adding realizable value to limited partnerships
as are cash or property.8 5 Importantly, TRLPA excludes promises of future
services from the valid forms of contribution.8 6 Future services traditionally
have been viewed as the type of consideration most prejudicial to creditors
because creditors consider such services valuable only if the enterprise re-
mains a going concern. 87 To the extent that these services remain unper-
formed, they may be totally valueless on liquidation.
88
TRLPA also makes significant changes to a limited partner's obligations
to make contributions to the limited partnership.8 9 Under TRLPA a prom-
ise by a limited partner to make a contribution to a limited partnership is not
enforceable unless set out in writing and signed by the limited partner, and,
unless the partnership agreement states otherwise, the partner or the part-
ner's legal representative or successor must satisfy the required contribution
to the limited partnership notwithstanding the partner's death, disability, or
other change in circumstances. 90 In addition, a partnership agreement may
provide that a partner who fails to make a contribution required by an en-
forceable promise will subject his or her interest in the limited partnership to
specified consequences, which may take the form of reduction of the interest
in the limited partnership, subordination of the interest to that of the other
partners, a forced sale of the interest, forfeiture of the interest, redemption or
sale of the partnership interest, or other penalties.91
TRLPA requires that, unless the partnership agreement states to the con-
trary, all partners must consent to the compromise or release of a partner's
obligation to make a contribution or to return cash or property received in
violation of TRLPA or the partnership agreement in order for the compro-
mise or release to be enforceable against the limited partnership. 92 A credi-
tor of the limited partnership, however, who acts in reasonable reliance on
that obligation, after the partner signs a writing that reflects the obligation
and before amendment or cancellation thereof, may enforce the original obli-
gation against the obligor partner.93 Of course, a general partner remains
liable to persons other than the partnership and the other partners notwith-
standing the compromise or release.94
financial provisions of TULPA impeded the growth of businesses organized as Texas limited
partnerships and prompted many limited partnerships to organize in states other than Texas.
Id.
85. Additionally, corporate law has long recognized labor done as valid consideration for
the issuance of stock. Id.; see TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT. ANN. art. 2.16 (Vernon 1980 & Supp.
1988).
86. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1, § 5.01 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
87. Id. § 5.01 comment.
88. Id. Interestingly, nothing in TRLPA explicitly requires that a limited partner make
any contribution to the limited partnership, although several TRLPA provisions contemplate
that the limited partner will do so. Id.; see id. §§ 1.07(a)(4), 5.01, .02, .04.
89. Id. § 5.02.
90. Id.
91. Id. § 5.02(c).





16. Profits, Losses and Distributions. TULPA contained a hodgepodge of
provisions regarding profits, losses, and distributions. First, TULPA re-
quired the certificate of limited partnership to contain a statement of the
share of profits or other compensation by way of income allocable to each
limited partner by reason of his or her contribution. 9 5 Second, TULPA per-
mitted limited partners to receive their shares of the profits only if the lim-
ited partnership's assets exceeded all of its liabilities.96 Third, TULPA did
not distinguish between allocation of profits, losses, distributions, and actual
distributions of income.97 TRLPA improves on TULPA in this regard by
providing that, in the absence of a written agreement, the partnership must
allocate profits and losses based on the proportional interests of the partners
set forth in the partnership records, or if none, in proportion to the partner's
capital accounts.98 Similarly, in the absence of a written agreement, the
partnership must distribute cash and other assets that are in return of capital
according to the agreed value stated in the records of the partnership. 99 For
distributions other than those in return of capital the limited partnership
must make such distributions based on the percentages used for allocation of
profits and losses.1°° TRLPA also modifies the rules governing the liability
of a limited partner for receiving an improper distribution and draws a dis-
tinction between interim distributions and distributions upon withdrawal of
a partner.' 0
17. Partners, Transaction of Business with the Partnership. TULPA per-
mitted limited partners to loan money to and transact business with the lim-
ited partnership, to receive an account of claims against the partnership, and
to collect a pro rata share of the limited partnership's assets, but dampened a
limited partner's incentive to do so by prohibiting a limited partner from
holding any partnership property for collateral purposes, or receiving any
conveyance, payment, or release from liability from the partnership or a gen-
eral partner. 102 Contravention of these prohibitions constituted fraud
against the partnership's creditors. 103 TRLPA adds much needed flexibility
to these types of transactions by providing that, unless the partnership agree-
ment states differently, the partnership may borrow money from and trans-
act business with any partner on such terms that may be mutually agreed by
the parties, and the partner will possess the same rights and obligations as a
nonpartner. 104
18. Assignment of Partnership Interest. TRLPA simplifies and clarifies the
95. Id. art. 6132a, § 3(1)(I).
96. Id. § 16.
97. Id. art. 6132a-1, § 5.04 Comment.
98. Id. § 5.03.
99. Id. § 5.04.
100. Id.
101. Id. §§ 6.01, .04, .07.
102. Id. art. 6132a, § 14(a) (Vernon 1970).
103. Id. § 14(b).
104. Id. art. 6132a-1, § 1.10 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
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process of assigning partnership interests. The primary simplification is that
under TRLPA the partnership agreement may provide in advance for the
handling of an assignment of a partnership interest. 10 5 Additionally,
TRLPA clarifies the status of an assignor of a limited partnership interest by
providing that, unless contrary to the provisions in the partnership agree-
ment, the assignor continues to have the status of a partner and this status
includes all the unassigned powers of a partner until the assignee becomes a
partner. 106 The assignee may become a limited partner if either the partner-
ship agreement permits or all the partners consent. 10 7 If the assignee be-
comes a limited partner, he or she obtains all the rights and powers assigned,
but also subjects himself or herself to the restrictions and liabilities of the
partnership agreement and TRLPA.108 In this regard, the assignee limited
partner assumes the assignor's obligation, if any, to make future capital con-
tributions.109 Liabilities unknown to the assignee and unascertainable from
the partnership agreement, however, do not bind the assignee. 10 Irrespec-
tive of whether the assignee becomes a limited partner, the assignment will
not release the assignor from liability for its financial obligations to the lim-
ited partnership." 1I
19. Mergers and Consolidations of Limited Partnerships. TRLPA breaks
new ground by providing a comprehensive statutory framework that enables
a domestic limited partnership to merge or consolidate with another limited
partnership simply by executing a written agreement and having the result-
ing limited partnership file a prescribed certificate of merger with the Secre-
tary of State on behalf of each domestic limited partnership that is a party to
the merger or consolidation. 12 The certificate of merger acts as a certificate
of cancellation for all of the limited partnerships in the merger or consolida-
tion, excluding the surviving partnership." 13
Upon an effective filing of the certificate of merger that the TRLPA re-
quires, Texas law considers all partnerships other than the surviving or re-
sulting partnership in the merger or consolidation terminated." 14 The
resulting limited partnership retains all property, real, personal and mixed,
and all other things belonging to each of those partnerships merged or con-
solidated. I 15 In addition to the property, the resulting partnership retains all
debts, liabilities, and duties of those partnerships and these obligations may
be enforced against the resulting partnership as if the resulting partnership
had incurred or contracted them. 16
105. Id. § 7.02.
106. Id.
107. Id. § 7.04(a).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. § 7.04(c).
111. Id.
112. Id. § 2.11(d).
113. Id. § 2.11(c).
114. Id. § 2.11(f).
115. Id.
116. Id. art. 6132b (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1988).
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20. Withdrawals by Partners. TULPA contained no provisions regarding a
partner's withdrawal from a limited partnership. Such a right, however, was
implied with respect to general partners under the Texas Uniform Partner-
ship Act (TUPA)" 17 and limited partners under provisions in TULPA that
dealt with substituted limited partners and return of contribution. 118 Under
TRLPA, a general partner has the power to withdraw from a limited part-
nership at any time by giving written notice to the other partners."l 9 If this
action violates the partnership agreement, however, the partnership may re-
cover damages from the partner. 1 20 In addition to other available remedies,
the partnership may effect that damages recovery by retaining funds distrib-
utable to the withdrawing general partner.121 Unless a written partnership
agreement provides otherwise, when a general partner ceases to be a general
partner the partnership also may either convert the general partner's interest
to that of a limited partner subject to any withdrawal liability or pay the
value of that partner's interest to the withdrawing general partner in cash or
secure that value by court approved bond. 122
In the event that the partners convert the withdrawing general partner's
interest to that of a limited partner, the limited partnership may choose to
provide compensation or an interest in the partnership to any replacement
general partner by reducing the proportional interest of the withdrawing
general partner pro rata with all other partners.1 2 3 After amending the cer-
tificate of limited partnership to reflect the general partner's withdrawal as a
general partner, the withdrawing general partner may vote as a limited part-
ner. 124 The withdrawing general partner may vote only if the members of
the class of limited partners that have the least voting rights with respect to
the matter may also vote. 125 The withdrawing general partner may not,
however, vote on the admission or compensation of any general partner re-
placing the withdrawing general partner.a26 Furthermore, the general part-
ner loses all voting rights if his withdrawal violates the partnership
agreement. 127
Personal liability does not attach to a withdrawing general partner under
TRLPA for partnership debt incurred after his withdrawal unless the credi-
tor reasonably believed that the partner remained a general partner at the
time of the creation of the debt.' 28 In this regard, reasonable basis for be-
lieving that a withdrawing general partner remains a general partner exists if
either (i) the creditor was a creditor of the partnership when the general
117. Id. § 31(2).
118. Id. art. 6132a-1, § 6.02 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
119. Id. § 6.02(a).
120. Id.
121. Id. § 6.02(b).





127. Id. § 6.02(d).
128. Id.
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partner withdrew or had extended credit to the partnership within two years
before the general partner withdrew and the creditor did not know or have
* notice that the general partner had withdrawn, or (ii) the creditor knew that
the general partner was a general partner in the partnership prior to the
withdrawal and did not know or have notice of the withdrawal.
1 29
Under TRLPA a limited partner may withdraw by giving a six month
written notice to each general partner, unless a written partnership agree-
ment provides otherwise or specifies the time for dissolution and winding up
of the limited partnership.130 The limited partner may send the notices to
the addresses of the general partners as stated in the partnership
agreement. 131
21. Dissolution and Winding Up. TRLPA modifies the dissolution provi-
sions of TULPA to provide more flexibility to the limited partnership in the
event of a dissolution.132 For example, limited partnerships under TRLPA
may provide in their partnership agreements for the automatic reconstitu-
tion of the limited partnership and continuation of its affairs after a dissolu-
tion if at least one general partner remains that desires to continue the
business. 133 Furthermore, TRLPA expressly permits such a reconstitution
and continuation within 90 days after dissolution, even absent a provision in
the partnership agreement, if the remaining partners unanimously agree to
continue the limited partnership's business.1
34
TRLPA also improves on TULPA by expressly dealing with what hap-
pens after dissolution if no one continues the limited partnership. 35 Under
TRLPA, the dissolution of the partnership triggers a process that requires
the winding up of the partnership's affairs by the remaining general partners
who have not wrongfully dissolved the limited partnership as soon as reason-
ably practicable, unless the partners reconstitute the partnership as discussed
above.136 Alternatively, a court, upon a showing of cause, may wind up the
limited partnership's affairs. 137 Furthermore, limited partners are now en-
couraged to involve themselves in the winding up of the partnership's affairs
under TRLPA because such activity will not subject them to liability beyond
that in existence before the commencement of the winding up process.'
38
22. Foreign Limited Partnerships. TULPA contained provisions that gen-
129. Id. § 6.03.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See id. §§ 8.01-.05.
133. Id. § 8.03(1).
134. Id. § 8.03(2). In the event that no general partners remain, the limited partners can
agree to appoint one or more new general partners. Id.
135. Id. § 8.04(a).
136. Id. This feature can prove to be especially useful in the context of a reorganization of
a limited partnership in bankruptcy. Id. § 8.04 comment.
137. Id. § 8.04(a). In order to accomplish this, a partner (or his or her legal representative
or assignee) must apply to the court for a winding up of the limited partnership, whereupon
the court may appoint a trustee to proceed with a liquidation of the limited partnership. Id
138. Id. § 8.04(c).
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erally dealt with the qualification and regulation of foreign limited partner-
ships that desired to transact business in Texas, but generally failed to
provide foreign limited partnership the degree of certainty necessary for
them to be comfortable in the Texas environment because there existed no
requirement for foreign partnership qualification.1 39 TRLPA expands the
law regarding foreign limited partnerships and provides badly needed cer-
tainty. Borrowing heavily from concepts of Texas corporation law, TRLPA
requires all foreign limited partnerships transacting business in Texas to reg-
ister with the Secretary of State.'14 TRLPA also prohibits a foreign limited
partnership from bringing an action in Texas until it registers and pays all
required fees in the event that it fails to so register.14' The failure to register
also would allow the Texas Attorney General to bring a suit to enjoin the
foreign limited partnership from transacting business in Texas.'
42
In an effort to provide more certainty to foreign limited partnerships in
light of the potentially harsh consequences resulting from failure to qualify,
TRLPA contains a nonexclusive list of twelve activities that do not consti-
tute "transacting business" in Texas.' 43 This list parallels a similar list for
foreign corporations under Texas corporation law.' 44 TRLPA also clarifies
existing law by providing that the laws of a foreign limited partnership's
state of formation will govern all matters relating to organization, internal
affairs, and the liability of partners of foreign limited partnerships (whether
or not registered).' 45 Under TULPA, an unregistered foreign limited part-
nership doing business in Texas could be considered a general
partnership.' 46
It should also be noted that TRLPA departs from TULPA by not requir-
ing a foreign limited partnership to submit its certificate of limited partner-
ship as part of its application to transact business.' 47 All that TRLPA
requires in the foreign limited partnership's application is information simi-
lar to that required of a domestic limited partnership plus the following:
(i) a statement of its business to be conducted in Texas, (ii) the name of its
state of formation, (iii) a statement that it validly exists as a limited partner-
ship in such state, and (iv) an appointment of the secretary of state of Texas
as agent for service of process.' 48
139. Id. art. 6132a, § 32. TULPA did not attempt to address the consequences of a foreign
limited partnership's failure to qualify to transact business in Texas. Id.
140. Id. art. 6132a-1, § 9.02(a).
141. Id. § 9.07.
142. Id. § 9.08.
143. Id. § 9.02(b).
144. TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 8.01(b) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
145. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1, § 9.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988). This is
known as the internal affairs doctrine. Id. comment. It should be noted, however, that
TRLPA only addresses foreign limited partnerships formed under the laws of another state of
the United States. See id. § 1.02 comment. Whether Texas courts will accord limited liability
to "limited partners" of entities formed in foreign countries is a determination left to choice of
law rules. Id.
146. See id. § 9.01.
147. Id. § 9.02(a).
148. Id.
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23. Derivative Actions. While the Texas Business Corporation Act (TBCA)
has for many years granted shareholders of a corporation the right to bring a
derivative suit in the event that the corporation or its officers and directors
have failed to pursue a right of the corporation,1 49 TULPA was devoid of
statutory authority that would grant a limited partner a similar right against
the limited partnership and its general partners. TRLPA improves on
TULPA in this regard by expressly granting a limited partner a conditional
right to bring a derivative action if the general partners with authority to
bring an action on behalf of the limited partnership have refused to bring
action or if the limited partner's effort to cause those general partners to
bring action is not likely to succeed.1 50 In order to bring a derivative suit,
the complaining party must be a limited partner at the time of bringing ac-
tion and must either have been a limited partner at the time of transaction of
which he or she complains or have had his or her status as a limited partner
devolved upon him or her by operation of law or by succession, pursuant to
terms of partnership agreement, from a person who was a limited partner at
the time of the transaction at issue.1 51 The complaining party also is re-
quired to plead with particularity the efforts he or she has made to secure
initiation of action by general partner or reasons for not making the effort. 15 2
In an effort to discourage frivolous derivative suits, TRLPA grants a court
discretion to require that the complaining party post security for the expense
expected for the defense in a fashion similar to corporate statutes, and pro-
vides other disincentives to strike suits.1 53 TRLPA also provides that a
court may award attorneys' fees and expenses to a successful complaining
party and may deprive a complaining party of any personal benefit the party
may obtain from bringing the derivative suit.' 54 Neither the TBCA nor the
TULPA has a provision similar to this.
24. Indemnification. Prior to the enactment of TRLPA, there was no ex-
press statutory authority that permitted a limited partnership to indemnify
its general partners against liability that the general partners might incur in
connection with actions taken on behalf of the limited partnership.1 55 De-
spite this lack of statutory authority, it was a common practice for partners
to provide indemnification to each other pursuant to general indemnification
agreements or simply by oral understandings.1 56 Such being the case, it was
the view of the drafters of TRLPA that a limited partnership should be able,
by expressed statutory authority, to afford its general partners the same type
of protection that a Texas corporation may afford its directors. Accordingly,
TRLPA provides for standards of indemnification similar to those set forth
149. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.14 (Vernon 1980).
150. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1, §§ 10.01-.05 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
151. Id. § 10.02.
152. Id. § 10.03.
153. Id. § 10.04.
154. Id. § 10.05. For example, sharing of a compromise settlement fee with the other lim-
ited partners. Id.




in TBCA section 2.02-1.157
Although the indemnification standards under TRLPA and TBCA gener-
ally are the same, one should be aware that the TRLPA provisions are sup-
plemented by the indemnification provisions of TUPA section 18(l)(b),
which provides that a partnership must indemnify every partner in respect of
payments made by and personal liabilities reasonably incurred by the part-
ner in the ordinary and proper conduct of the partnership's business, or for
the preservation of its business or property. 58
B. Corporation Law
The Texas Legislature during the 1987 regular session enacted legislation
modernizing Texas corporation law regarding director liability limitations
and indemnification and includes several significant changes to prior law.
1. Limitations on Director Liability. In response to a recent crisis in ob-
taining director's liability insurance in both Texas and other states, and in an
effort to encourage qualified persons to serve as directors by reducing their
exposure to liability, the Texas Legislature passed a bill during the last regu-
lar session that permits a corporation to amend its articles of incorporation
to provide for certain limitations on the monetary damages a director may
be liable for to the corporation or its shareholders or members.1 59 In gen-
eral, these limitations extend to monetary damages for an act or omission in
a director's capacity as a director. '60 The statute does not eliminate or limit
the liability of a director for any of the following six matters: (i) a breach of
the director's loyalty to the corporation or its shareholders or members,
(ii) an act or omission not in good faith or involving intentional misconduct
or a knowing violation of the law, (iii) a transaction from which a director
received an improper benefit, whether or not the benefit resulted from an
action taken within the scope of the director's office, (iv) an act or omission
for which the liability of a director is expressly provided for by statute, (v) an
act related to an unlawful stock repurchase or payment of a dividend, and
(vi) an act or omission occurring prior to the later of (A) August 31, 1987,
157. TRLPA only "generally" provides for the same standards of indemnification as the
TBCA because certain amendments to TBCA indemnification provisions were made at the
same time as TRLPA and are intended to be reflected in TRLPA. Id. Unfortunately, the
amendments and TRLPA took different legislative paths and timing, which caused certain
language differences between the two provisions. Id. These differences in language are not
intended to provide different substantive standards unless specifically noted on the comments
to the specific provisions. Id. The commentary to TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02-1
(Vernon Supp. 1988) and the 1980 revision of the Model Business Corporation Act Section 5
contain explanations of the operation of and legal principles underlying these provisions. Id.;
MOD. Bus. CORP. ACT § 5 (1980).
158. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 18(l)(b) (Vernon 1970). TUPA's indemni-
fication provisions continue to apply to limited partnerships by virtue of TRLPA § 13.03 and
TUPA § 6(2). Id. art. 6132a-1, art. II comment (Vernon Supp. 1988).
159. Tex. S.B. 260, 70th Leg. (1987).
160. Since the statute by its terms extends only to directors and does not expressly extend
any relief to officers, the legislation may benefit persons who are both directors and officers of
the same corporation regarding their actions as directors but not as officers.
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the effective date of the law, or (B) the date the articles include the corpora-
tion's liability limitation provision.161
2. Indemnification. The same insurance crisis also prompted the enact-
ment of new indemnification provisions which allow a corporation to pro-
vide its directors with indemnification and assistance in three ways. First, a
corporation may indemnify a director in limited instances against reasonable
expenses in the event that the director is found liable to the corporation or
on the basis that a personal benefit was received by the director.162 Second,
a corporation also may advance expenses to a director based solely upon the
corporation's receipt of the director's written affirmation that (i) the stan-
dards for indemnification have been met, and (ii) the director will repay the
advance if it is ultimately determined that the director is not entitled to in-
demnification.163 Third, a corporation also may purchase insurance, or im-
plement self-insurance arrangements, for liabilities for which indemnification
is not permitted, provided that there is shareholder approval. 164
3. Distributions to Shareholders. The amendments to the TBCA during the
Survey period also included an overhaul of the financial provisions gov-
erning the payment of corporate dividends and redemptions and a recodifi-
cation of all related provisions in one section of the TBCA. Under prior law,
a corporation's ability to pay a dividend or redeem stock was determined by
reference to its "earned surplus," "reduction surplus" and "capital sur-
plus". 165 Because of the confusion and disagreement among practitioners
regarding the application of these concepts to dividends and redemptions,
the legislature eliminated each of these particular terms from the statute. In
place of dividends and redemptions, the legislature substituted the concept
of a "distribution," which is defined as "a transfer of money or other prop-
erty (except its own shares or rights to acquire its own shares), or issuance of
indebtedness, by a corporation to its shareholders in the form of a dividend,
a share repurchase or a liquidating distribution."' 166 Because the concepts
earned surplus, reduction surplus and capital surplus are no longer in the
statute, the determination of a corporation's ability to make a distribution,
subject to any restrictions in its articles of incorporation, is determined by
reference to (i) its "surplus", which continues to be defined as the excess of
the net assets of the corporation over its stated capital, and (ii) its solvency
after giving effect to the distribution. 167 As a result of this change in the
statute, a corporation generally will be prohibited from making any distribu-
161. Act of June 17, 1987, ch. 424, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3493 (Vernon).
162. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. art. 2.02-1 (Vernon Supp. 1988). This indemnification,
however, is available only if the director was not found liable for willful or intentional miscon-
duct in performing his or her duties to the corporation. Id.
163. Id. Importantly, there is no longer any requirement of a prior determination by the
disinterested directors that the facts known to them would not or would not preclude indemni-
fication, or whether the director would have the ability to repay the advances.
164. Id.
165. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. art. 1.02A (Vernon Supp. 1988).
166. Id. art. 1.02A(18).
167. Id. arts. 2.38B, 1.02(12).
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tion if either (i) the corporation would be insolvent after giving effect to the
distribution, or (ii) the distribution would exceed the surplus of the corpora-
tion. 168 The legislature also provided corporations with broad flexibility in
selecting the types of financial information upon which the corporations may
rely in determining their net assets, stated capital and surplus. 16 9
4. Mergers and Reorganizations. The TBCA was amended to clarify that
no transfer or assignment occurs in connection with the vesting of rights,
privileges, immunities and franchises of a merged corporation in a surviving
corporation. 170 Also, the Secretary of State's authority was expanded to per-
mit it to accept court ordered articles of merger, consolidation, or dissolu-
tion without shareholder action. 1 71
5. Sales of Substantially All Assets. Prior law was ambiguous regarding
when shareholder approval was required for the sale of substantially all of
the assets of a corporation in the usual and regular course of business. New
TBCA article 5.09B addresses the ambiguity by defining the term "usual and
regular course of business," rather than trying to clarify "substantially all."
Under the new definition, assets are disposed of in the "usual and regular
course of business" when (i) the corporation, after the disposition, continues
to engage in one or more businesses or (ii) the corporation applies a portion
of the proceeds received from the transaction to a business it engages in after
the transaction. An important consequence of this change is that it is now
clear that a sale of assets by a corporation to a subsidiary or a master limited
partnership will not constitute an asset disposition that would require share-
holder approval. As a result, corporate asset dispositions in general will no
longer require shareholder approval except where the corporation, after the
disposition, liquidates and ceases to do business.
6. Bylaw Amendments. Another important legislative change during this
Survey period has clarified who may amend bylaws. Under prior law, the
possibility existed that shareholders as a general rule could not amend or
repeal the bylaws of a corporation unless and until the board of directors had
approved such proposed amendment or repeal. New TBCA article 2.23
makes it clear that, unless provided otherwise in the articles of incorporation
or a bylaw adopted by the shareholders of the corporation, the shareholders
may always amend or repeal the corporation's bylaws or adopt new bylaws.
168. Id. art. 2.38B. There are specific instances, however, in which a corporation may
make a distribution regardless of whether it exceeds the corporation's surplus so long as the
corporation is still solvent after giving effect to the distribution. See id. art. 2.38C.
169. Id. art. 2.38-3A. The legislature also added several new articles to the TBCA as part
of the modernization and clarification of its financial provisions, including articles that
(i) clarify when share dividends may be made and the appropriate accounting for such transac-
tions, (ii) clarify that a split-up or division of issued shares without an increase in the corpora-
tion's stated capital does not constitute a share dividend or a distribution, and (iii) permit the
issuance of a special class of redeemable stock that does not have a liquidation preference. See
id. arts. 2.38-1, -2, 2.12B.
170. Id. art. 5.06A(4).
171. Id. art. 4.14.
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7. Special Shareholders' Meetings. An amendment to the TBCA designed
to assist corporations in their efforts to frustrate hostile suitors grants corpo-
rations the flexibility of specifying in their articles of incorporation percent-
age of shareholders necessary to call a special meeting. Under prior law, this
percentage was 10%. Under the amendment, a corporation may establish
this percentage at any level not in excess of 50%.172
8. Record Dates and Notices to the Shareholders. The maximum time peri-
ods for notice of shareholder meetings and fixing transfer dates or closing of
books for transfer of stocks have been increased from fifty to sixty days.
This change provides corporations with an additional ten days to comply
with the various statutory and administrative requirements relating to no-
tices of meetings and dividend dates as well as requirements relating to
proxy solicitations.
9. Close Corporations. In order to remedy an apparent duplication of re-
quirements for bylaws of close corporations in the TBCA, the legislature
amended TBCA article 2.15 to provide that a corporation need not have
separate bylaws if a shareholders' agreement embodies the corporation's by-
law provisions. Also, the legislature amended article 3.02(A)(9) to permit
close corporation provisions to appear in both shareholder agreements and
articles of incorporation.
10. Dismantling of the Title 32 Miscellaneous Corporate Statutes. The leg-
islature dismantled the Miscellaneous Statutes located in title 32 of the
Texas Revised Civil Statutes (TMCSA articles 1349, 1351, 1353, 1354,
1358a, and 1358b) by repealing them in total and selectively amending the
TBCA or the Texas Nonprofit Corporation Act to incorporate those provi-
sions have continuing validity. Articles 1358a and 1358b contained the most
significant provisions of continuing validity. Article 1358a, which related to
proper payees of corporate distributions of cash or property, was modified to
resolve certain conflicts and moved to TBCA article 2.26B. Prior to this, the
TBCA contained no provision that expressly permitted a corporation or its
transfer agent to regard the record holder of the corporation's shares as
"shareholders" for the purpose of receiving dividends and other distribu-
tions. Article 1358b, which provided that shares held in the name of two or
more persons as joint owners with right of survivorship, may be treated by
the issuing corporation as owned by the survivor or survivors until the cor-
poration receives actual written notice that other persons claim an interest in
such shares or in any dividends payable in respect of such shares, also was
retained and moved to TBCA article 2.22G.
C. Securities Law
1. Refinement of the Commercial Paper Exemption. The Texas State Se-
curities Board adopted a new regulation that further defines the kinds of
172. Id. art. 2.23.
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negotiable promissory notes and commercial paper that are exempted from
the registration requirements of the Texas Securities Act. 173 The new regu-
lation exempts "good faith issuances" of negotiable promissory notes and
commercial paper. Such issuances are considered to be in good faith only if
the issuer is financing current transactions with them and the issuer is not
dependent on the continuing sale of notes and commercial paper to generate
funds to retire the notes or paper at maturity. Abusive uses of the Texas
Securities Act exemption under section 6.H prompted the rule, which is in-
tended to restrict those uses.
2. Conforming Texas Private Offering Exemption. In November 1986, the
Texas State Securities Board amended the Texas Uniform Limited Offering
Exemption 74 to conform with changes adopted earlier in the year to Regu-
lation D and Form D under the Securities Act of 1933.175
3. State Securities Board Proposal of Section 5 Exemption from Merit Re-
view. The Texas State Securities Board proposed an amendment to the State
Securities Regulations that would have liberalized the merit review applied
to certain firm underwritten offerings of common stock. 17 6 The proposal,
however, was short lived because of a Texas Attorney General Opinion is-
sued shortly thereafter that concluded that any attempt by the Board to pro-
mulgate such an amendment would be unconstitutional. The Board
thereupon withdrew the proposal.
II. CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS
A. Partnership Law
1. Interpretation of a Partnership Agreement. In Cunningham And Co. v.
Consolidated Realty Management, Inc. 177 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit considered whether certain provisions of a limited
partnership's agreement permitted the general partner to dispose of the lim-
ited partnership's sole asset during the winding up and termination of the
limited partnership without first obtaining the unanimous consent of the
other partners. Cunningham was a limited partner in a limited partnership
that was formed for the purpose of constructing, owning and operating an
apartment building project. Under the terms of the partnership agreement, a
simple majority in interest of the partners could dissolve the limited partner-
ship by voting to do so. The partnership agreement, however, also provided
that the general partner had no authority to perform any act that would
make it impossible to carry on the business of the partnership, absent a
unanimous vote by all the limited partners.
78
173. Tex. Sec. Bd., 11 Tex. Reg. 4151 (1986) (adopting 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 111.4).
174. Tex. Sec. Bd., 11 Tex. Reg. 4666 (1986) (adopting 7 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 109.13(k)).
175. Id.
176. Proposed amendment to 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE 113.3 (February 2, 1987).
177. 803 F.2d 840 (5th Cir. 1986).
178. This provision reads as follows:
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In 1981 Cunningham and the other partners in the limited partnership
began searching for a buyer for the project but they received no satisfactory
offers for over two years. Finally, the partners found a third-party buyer
and, at a meeting to which Cunningham was invited but which he did not
attend, all of the other partners agreed to sell the project to the third-party
buyer. On July 26, 1983 the general partner, Consolidated Realty Manage-
ment, executed a sales contract concerning the sale and also signed a con-
tract with the new owners to continue managing the project. Cunningham
objected to the sale and sued the other partners for breach of the partnership
agreement. 179 The district court entered a take-nothing judgment against
Cunningham and Cunningham appealed. 180
The Fifth Circuit determined that an apparent conflict in the partnership
agreement existed between the prohibited transactions provision, which re-
quired the unanimous consent of the partners, and the dissolution provision,
which required the consent of simply a majority in interest of the part-
ners. 18 To resolve the matter the court applied a general rule of contract
interpretation that courts will read apparently conflicting clauses of a con-
tract so as to give effect to both.1 82 Applying this rule the court read the
unanimous vote requirement as applying to the sale of all or a large portion
of the partnership assets if the partnership intends to continue, but not
where, as here, the sale is pursuant to a vote of a dissolution.1 83 While the
unanimity requirement protects a minority partner from a variation in his
investment while his money remains obligated to the partnership, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that this requirement is not necessary in the event of ter-
mination of the partnership because each partner receives in connection
therewith a distribution of his or her share of the equity of the partner-
ship.18 4 Moreover, the court realized that the majority's right to agree to
dissolve is useless if a minority can prevent the sale of assets that constitute a
requisite part of dissolution.18 5 Accordingly, the court concluded that
where there has been a vote to dissolve, that vote implies the power to take
all necessary steps, including the sale of assets, to carry out the winding up
and termination of the partnership after the dissolution.186
The court also looked to section 10(a) of TULPA and the legislative his-
[Without the written consent or ratification of the specific act by all the lim-
ited partners the general partner shall have no authority to: ...
2. do any act which would make it impossible to carry on the business of the
partnership; ... [or]
4. ... assign the rights of the limited partners in specific partnership for other
than a partnership; ...
Id. at 842. This provision of the partnership agreement traced the exact wording of section
10(a) of TULPA.
179. 803 F.2d at 842. Cunningham also sued the general partner for breach of fiduciary
duty and sued the general partner, the other partners and the third party buyer for conspiracy.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 843.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 844.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 843.
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tory thereunder to interpret the unanimous consent provision of the partner-
ship agreement and concluded that section 10(a) permits the dissolution and
winding up of a partnership provided a majority of the limited partners ap-
proves the dissolution as provided in the certificate.' 8 7
2. Formation. Austin v. Truly 188 involved the issue of whether a joint ven-
turer breached a joint venture agreement (i) by failing to execute a promis-
sory note necessary to finance the joint venture, and (ii) by repudiating
personal liability on all joint venture debts. Jack Truly, James Austin and
Gerald Clark each signed and approved the written document prepared by
Truly's attorney, entitled "Agreement to Enter Into a Joint Venture Agree-
ment." A transmittal letter that accompanied the execution drafts from
Truly's attorney stated that time constraints prevented him from completing
the joint venture agreement that Truly had requested, but that he had
drafted a contract to enter into such an agreement that would enable the
parties to legally bind themselves to the basic terms and conditions concern-
ing the proposed joint venture to which they had already agreed.
The document provided that Truly, Austin, and Clark were to enter into a
joint venture agreement for the purpose of financing the acquisition of a par-
cel of real estate and developing a shopping center thereon. Under the terms
of the document, (i) Austin was to sell the real estate to the venture,
(ii) Austin and Clark were to arrange financing of the venture, and
(iii) Truly, an experienced developer of shopping centers, was to supervise
the construction and development of the shopping center that the venture
contemplated. Austin and Clark each were to receive a 30% ownership and
profits interest under the terms of the document and Truly was to receive a
40% interest. The document also provided for Truly to receive a $2,000 per
month draw from the venture during its first 12 months.
Shortly after the execution of the agreement, a dispute arose concerning
whether Truly would have personal liability for the repayment of the devel-
opment financing. Truly's position was that the development financing was
to be nonrecourse as to him and, as a result, he refused to appear at the bank
for the closing of the financing. Austin and Clark proceeded to close the
financing without Truly and, thereafter, Truly terminated further associa-
tion with the venture and the shopping center.
Truly later brought an action against Austin and Clark for breach of con-
tract and, alternatively, quantum meruit for the value of his time, effort, and
service in carrying out his obligations under the agreement. Austin and
Clark counterclaimed alleging breach of contract and breach of fiduciary
187. Id. at 843-44. After the formation of the limited partnership, the Texas Attorney
General issued an opinion that construed section 10 of TULPA as requiring the unanimous
consent of all partners in order to terminate a limited partnership. Op. Tex. Att'y. Gen. No.
H-1229 (1978). The Attorney General, however, later reversed himself on this issue in re-
sponse to protest from the legal community. Op. Tex. Att'y. Gen. No. H-1321 (1978). See
Bromberg, Bateman, Hamilton, Lebowitz & Winship, Unanimity in Limited Partnership No
Longer Required by Attorney General, 16 Bull. Section on Corp., Banking & Bus. L. 3 (March
1979).
188. 721 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, no writ).
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duty. The trial court entered judgment based on a jury verdict in the
amount of $215,480 against Austin and Clark and also awarded attorney's
fees to Truly.' 89 Austin and Clark appealed, claiming 52 points of error.
The appellate court, in a splintered decision, held that (i) Truly was per-
sonally liable for the debts of the venture on the grounds that he willingly
became a partner in the venture based on the agreement, and (ii) Truly
would be entitled to no recovery based on quantum meruit if the agreement
was unambiguous and covered the compensation due him for the value of his
time. ' 90 On this basis the court reversed the judgment of the trial court and
remanded the case solely for the determination of the amount of recovery
due Truly with respect to his right to receive draws under the agreement. 9 1
Justice Burgess vigorously dissented to the majority's holding that quan-
tum meruit did not lie in the case. 192 In Justice Burgess's view, the agree-
ment merely consisted of an agreement to form the relationship of the joint
venturers at some future time, and it did not contractually place a dollar
value on Truly's services in obtaining leases for the shopping center; it con-
stituted merely an agreement to form a future agreement. 193 In addition,
since Truly owned a 40% interest in the venture, performing fully entitled
him to the reasonable value of his services anyway. Justice Burgess, there-
fore, preferred to hold as a matter of law that the agreement did not concern
the subject matter of Truly's claim, thereby allowing a recovery based on
quantum merit. 194 Justice Burgess also preferred to find no cap on the re-
covery. 195 Since the parties did not intend the $24,000 to be Truly's only
remuneration for his services, Burgess did not consider this sum a limitation
on the value of Truly's services. 196 Burgess concluded that the agreement
entitled Truly to receive $24,000 for expenses, a 40% interest in the develop-
ment, and the value of his services. 197
3. Relations of Partners to One Another. Reilly v. Rangers Management,
Inc. 198 involved the validity of certain amendments to a limited partnership
agreement. Rangers Management, Inc. (Rangers Management) and CCK,
Inc. (CCK), general partners in Texas Rangers, Ltd. 199 proposed to amend
the limited partnership agreement to change the price for which additional
partnership units could be issued and to permit the partnership to issue an
189. Id.
190. Id. at 919. See Woodward v. Southwest States, Inc., 384 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex. 1964).







198. 727 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. 1987).
199. Texas Rangers, Ltd., a limited partnership, intended by buy and run an American
League baseball franchise commonly known as the Texas Rangers. A second general partner,
CCK, Inc., later jointed Rangers Management, Inc., the initial general partner.
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unlimited number of units.20 0 Michael Reilly, one of Texas Rangers' seven-
teen limited partners, opposed the validity of the proposed amendments, the
issuance of additional units and the dilution of his investment. Reilly
claimed that the proposed amendments could not be adopted consistent with
the provisions of the limited partnership agreement without the unanimous
consent of the limited partners. 20 1
Rangers Management and CCK sought a declaratory judgment finding
the proposed amendments validly adopted and the limited partnership agree-
ment, as amended, in full force and effect. 20 2 The district court granted par-
tial summary judgment in favor of Rangers Management and CCK.20 3
Reilly appealed on the grounds that the proposed amendments required the
unanimous consent of the limited partners according to the terms of the
limited partnership agreement.
The court of appeals overruled each of Reilly's points of error and af-
firmed the district court's judgment. 2 4 With respect to the general liability
argument, the court of appeals stated that for an amendment to adversely
affect the general liability of limited partners, the amendment must make a
limited partner liable beyond his partnership contribution. 205 The court
found that the proposed amendments did not require the limited partners to
increase their partnership contributions. 20 6 Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that the proposed amendments did not unfavorably alter the general
liabilities of the limited partners. 20 7
Concerning allocations of profits and losses, Reilly argued that the possi-
bility of an unlimited number of partners to share in profits and losses ac-
cording to their proportional interests changed the basic foundation of the
partnership agreement's profit and loss allocation provisions. The court of
appeals agreed that the more partners there are, the smaller the percentage
of profits each will receive. 208 The court pointed out, however, that an in-
crease in the number of partners did not actually change the method of allo-
200. The limited partnership agreement provided for the issuance of a maximum of 300
partnership units and set the price per unit at a minimum of $50,000 each.
201. The agreement required the unanimous consent of the limited partners for any amend-
ment that would (i) impair the general liabilities of the limited partners, (ii) modify the system
of allocation of the profits or losses of the partnership, or (iii) modify the mode of distribution
of the partnership funds or assets. All other amendments to the partnership agreement re-
quired the approval of the holders of a two-thirds percentage interest in the partnership. At
the time the general partners proposed the amendments for adoption, RMI and CCK owned
an 83.78% percentage interest in the partnership. RMI, CCK, and five limited partners voted
in favor of the proposed amendments. One limited partner voted against the proposed amend-
ments. Eleven partners, including Reilly, did not vote.
202. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2524-1 (repealed 1985) (current version at TEX.
CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.004 (Vernon 1986)).
203. Id. at 844.
204. Reilly v. Rangers Management, Inc., 717 S.W.2d 442, 443 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1986) rev'd, 727 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. 1987).
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cation of profits and losses.20 9 The numerical increase merely changed the
number of partners to whom the partnership distributed profits and
losses. 21 0 The court of appeals concluded that the method of allocation of
profits and losses would not change as a result of the proposed
amendments. 211
With respect to the distribution contention, Reilly asserted that the pro-
posed amendments result in a dilution that could reduce or even totally elim-
inate a partner's share to which he or she was previously entitled, and that
this diminution constituted a change in the "distribution of the partnership
funds or assets."'2 12 The appellate court acknowledged that the sale of addi-
tional partnership units could possibly reduce or eliminate the distribution of
partnership funds and assets; however, the court refused to conclude that
this constituted a change in the method of distribution. 21 3
Reilly's final contention was that TULPA section 10 barred the admission
of additional limited partners absent a provision in the certificate to the con-
trary; therefore, the law required unanimous consent to adopt the proposed
amendments. 21 4 The court of appeals concluded that the proposed amend-
ments did not give the general partner the authority to admit additional lim-
ited partners. 215 Rather, the proposed amendments simply allowed for the
issuance of partnership units in excess of the prior maximum of 300 units,
while not specifying who the purchasers would be. 2 16 Because the proposed
amendments did not alter the general partner's power to admit additional
limited partners, the court reasoned that the law did not require unanimous
consent to adopt the proposed amendments. 21 7
Reilly applied for and received a writ of error from the Texas Supreme
Court. 21 8 At the supreme court level, Reilly asserted that the limited part-
nership agreement was ambiguous with respect to the unanimous consent
provision and, therefore, that the district court had erred in granting sum-
209. Id.
210. Id. at 448. The court stated that modification of the agreement resulting in the man-
aging general partner receiving a different percentage constituted a change in the method of
distribution. An amendment giving the general partners a fixed amount instead of distributing
to them their proportional share based on individual interests in the partnership also consti-
tuted a change in the method of distribution. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 449.
213. Id.
214. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 10 (Vernon 1970). In support of the same
contention, Reilly asserted that sections 25(b)(3) and 26(a)(2) of the TULPA required the
signatures and sworn oath of all limited partners prior to adoption of an amendment. Id.
§§ 25(b)(3), 26(a)(2). The appellate court characterized this additional support as an accurate
statement of the law, but noted that Reilly and the other limited partners had assigned the
power of attorney found in the original agreement to the general partners, transferring to them
the authority to sign any validly adopted amendment on behalf of the limited partners. Reilly,
717 S.W.2d at 450. The general partners therefore did not need the signature of each limited
partner to adopt the proposed modification. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 33
(Vernon Supp. 1988).
215. Reilly, 717 S.W.2d at 450.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 140 (Jan. 17, 1987).
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mary judgment in favor of Rangers Management and CCK. The court
agreed with Reilly and remanded the case to the district court for a trial on
the grounds that a question of fact existed concerning the interpretation of
the limited partnership agreement. 21 9
In order to determine whether the intention of the parties as evidenced by
the agreement was ambiguous, the supreme court looked at the limited part-
nership agreement as a whole in light of the circumstances existing at the
time the parties entered into the agreement. Pertinent to the supreme
court's inquiry was the rule of construction that "a court should construe
contracts from a utilitarian standpoint bearing in mind the particular busi-
ness activity sought to be served and need not embrace strained rules of
interpretation which would avoid ambiguity at all cost."'220 The supreme
court also found relevant to its inquiry the rule that a court will avoid an
unreasonable, inequitable, and oppressive construction of an agreement un-
less such avoidance is impossible or improper. 22 1
Reading the limited partnership agreement in a light most favorable to
Reilly, the supreme court determined that (i) the limited partnership agree-
ment evidenced the limited partners' intent to protect their limited partner-
ship interests from dilution, and (ii) a reasonable and utilitarian construction
of the unanimous consent provision was that the parties intended that the
provision would protect against a nonconsensual dilution of a limited part-
ner's interest.222 Elimination of such a protection without the unanimous
consent of the limited partners, the court concluded, was potentially oppres-
sive.223 Accordingly, the supreme court held that a fact issue existed as to
whether the amendments required unanimous approval and remanded the
case to the district court for trial.224 Three justices dissented from the opin-
ion based on their view that the limited partnership agreement was clear and
unambiguous. 225
4. Retirement or Withdrawal of a Partner. Perry v. Welch 226 involved the
classic case of a young partner who bought into a professional services part-
nership shortly before the retirement of the partnership's rainmaker. R. J.
Welch and several other persons were partners in Welch, White & Co., a Rio
Grande Valley accounting firm. On July 1, 1980 Lester Perry and Noble
Allen bought a one-seventh ownership and profits interest in the partnership
by executing substantially identical installment promissory notes to each of
the other partners in the firm. The notes provided in relevant part that the
basis for determining the amount and payment date of each installment due
under the notes was by reference to the date and amount of each cash with-





224. Id. at 530-31.
225. Id.
226. 725 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ).
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drawal of partnership profits made "by the partners of Welch, White & Co."
pursuant to their partnership agreement. Perry and Allen made note pay-
ments to Welch through June 1981, but stopped making payments upon
Welch's retirement from the partnership on July 31, 1981. Welch brought a
suit to collect on the notes and prevailed in the trial court.227
Perry and Allen appealed the trial court's judgment in favor of Welch,
contending that a condition precedent to their obligation to make payments
under the notes existed: namely, that Perry and Allen receive profits specifi-
cally from the partners of Welch, White & Co. Perry and Allen argued that
this condition failed upon the retirement of Welch, because his retirement
resulted in dissolution of the partnership. Perry and Allen asserted that, as a
result of the dissolution and the accompanying change in the legal relation-
ship of the partners, each of them ceased to receive profits from the partners
of Welch, White & Co. as such and, therefore, they were also relieved from
their liability to Welch under the notes. Perry and Allen also contended that
Welch's retirement after the execution of the notes constituted a supervening
cause that resulted in a failure of consideration, thus discharging their liabil-
ity under the notes.
The court of appeals was unsympathetic to Perry and Allen and affirmed
the decision of the trial court.228 The court based its decision on the general
rule that a forfeiture of contractual duties because of a failure of a condition
precedent must be avoided if other reasonable interpretations to the agree-
ment exist. 229 The court reasoned that Perry and Allen were not permitted
to ignore a previous obligation to pay simply because a deal proved less prof-
itable than anticipated. Furthermore, the court rejected Perry's and Allen's
contention that the retirement of partners is a supervening cause, and found
no reversible error in the lower court's conclusions of law or findings of
fact. 230
5. Power of a General Partner. Citizens State Bank v. Caney Investments231
involved a permanent injunction staying a bank's attempt to foreclose its lien
on real property belonging to a limited partnership. The general partner of
the limited partnership had deeded the property to the bank for other than
partnership purposes without the consent of the limited partners. Relying on
TULPA section 10(a)(4), the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judg-
ment that the deed was void, rather than merely voidable, because a general
partner lacks the requisite authority to assign rights in such property if the
assignment is for other than partnership purposes.232 Under the court of
appeals holding, the bank's claim as a result of the void deed remained alive





231. 733 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dis.] 1987) rev'd, 746 S.W.2d 477 (Tex.
1988)).
232. Id. at 586.
1988]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
should be noted, however, that the Texas Supreme Court subsequently re-
versed the judgment of the court of appeals and vacated the permanent in-
junction on other grounds.233
6. Proper Party to Assert Claim. Thomasson v. Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Co. 234 involved a limited partnership, Republic Refining Limited
(RRL), formed to build and operate a gas processing plant. A group of
banks financed the construction of the project, but RRL defaulted on the
construction loans and went into bankruptcy. The minority partners in
RRL brought an action in the Federal District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Texas against the banks, alleging that the banks had committed a
series of wrongs through a conspiracy with RRL's managing partner. The
banks moved for dismissal on the grounds, inter alia, that the minority part-
ners lacked standing because the partners were asserting partnership inter-
ests, rather than individual interests.
The Thomasson case presented a unique question heretofore unaddressed
within the Fifth Circuit. The leading Fifth Circuit case regarding the issue
of the ability of an individual partner to assert partnership-related interests is
Cates v. International Telephone & Telegraph Co.2 3 5 In Cates the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that an individual partner generally has no standing to assert part-
nership claims in his or her individual capacity because such claims are
subsumed within the causes of action of the partnership. The court, how-
ever, was careful to provide that in a proper case, Texas law would afford
some remedy other than merely a damage or accounting suit against the
controlling partners, at least where the latter would not be reasonably effec-
tive to protect the substantial rights of the minority. For example, where the
controlling partners, for improper, ulterior motives and not because of what
they believe to be the best interest of the partnership, decline to sue on a
valid, valuable partnership cause of action which it is advantageous to the
partnership to pursue, some remedy will be provided to the minority partner
or partnership interest owner. 236 Cates does not clarify, however, whether
those claims become individual claims or remain partnership claims that mi-
nority partners may assert on behalf of the partnership. 237
233. Under application of writ of error and without hearing oral argument, the Texas
supreme court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and vacated an order of the trial
court that granted a permanent injunction. 746 S.W.2d at 479. The trial court erroneously
permitted respondents, who were in fact third parties, to intervene following a final judgment.
The supreme court stated that the trial court as well as the court of appeals erred in assuming
jurisdiction and that the appeal required dismissal. Id. at 478. The more devastating aspect of
the case occurred when the trial court refused to honor the bank's constitutional right to a jury
trial. As a result of the foregoing, the court held that the judgment of the court of appeals
conflicted with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 216, reversed the judgment, and vacated the
trial court's order. Id. at 479.
234. 657 F. Supp. 448 (N.D. Tex. 1987).
235. 756 F.2d 1161, 1173-74 (5th Cir. 1985).
236. Thomasson, 657 F. Supp. at 451.
237. The Thomasson court noted:
The Cates court outlined several possible remedies which might be available
to such a partner/plaintiff. The court suggested that the individual partner
might maintain suit "either derivatively in the name of the partnership, or for
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The unresolved issue in Cates surfaced in Thomasson because RRL was
involved in bankruptcy proceedings. The resolution of this issue was critical
because if the claims did remain partnership claims, the claims would be
property of the partnership's estate and the individual partners could not
assert them. Only if the claims belong to the individual partners could the
individual partners assert them.
Because the Cates opinion did not resolve the matter, the court looked to
other jurisdictions for further guidance.2 38 The court concluded that to the
extent that claims for conversion and damages for destruction of property,
related to money or property contributed by the minority partners to RRL,
those claims should be characterized as partnership claims. As such, the
court dismissed them. By contrast, the allegations of aiding and abetting
breach of fiduciary duty and tortious interference were claims alleging an
interference with the relationships between their copartners and with the
partnership. Thus, the minority partners could assert these claims as indi-
vidual claims.2 39
The court, however, had difficulty categorizing the minority partners'
RICO claims and common law fraud claims. Therefore, it declined to dis-
miss the claims in their entirety, dismissing them only as they related to
damage to the minority partners' contribution to the partnership. 24°
B. Corporation Law
1. Incorporation of a Partnership. Holt v. Owen Electric Supply, Inc. 24 , ex-
emplifies the problems that can arise when a partnership incorporates with-
out changing its firm name or giving notice of its incorporation as article
1302-2.02 of the Texas Miscellaneous Corporation Laws Act requires. 242
his percentage of such claims, or alternatively [might] .. .have action on the
case deferred until a receivership application could be acted on ... or the part-
nerships' winding up could be completed."
657 F. Supp. at 451-52, quoting Cates, 756 F.2d at 1180.
238. The court relied upon Mannaberg v. Herbst, 45 N.Y.S.2d 197 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1943),
aff'd 267 App. Div. 818, 47 N.Y.S.2d 100, aff'd, 292 N.Y. 657, 56 N.E.2d 255 (1944); and
Hauer v. Bankers Trust New York Corp., 509 F. Supp. 168, 175 (E.D. Wis. 1981). The court
in Thomasson quoted the following language from Mannaberg wherein the court held that the
partner/plaintiff could sue on his own behalf for a wrong against the partnership:
[W]here one partner and a third person by fraud or breach of fiduciary duty
cause a disposition, waste, or diminution of partnership property under circum-
stances rendering the third person liable therefore; the act of the third party at
least must be regarded.., as an individual wrong to each other partner for which
each may recover his own damages.
Thomasson, 657 F. Supp. at 453, quoting Mannaberg, 45 N.Y.S. at 201 (emphasis by Thomas-
son court).
239. 657 F. Supp. at 453.
240. Id. at 453-54.
241. 722 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ).
242. TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.02A (Vernon 1980), provides as follows:
Whenever any banking, mercantile or other business firm desires to become
incorporated without a change of firm name, such firm shall, in addition to the
notice of dissolution required at common law, give notice of such intention to
become incorporated for at least four (4) consecutive weeks in some newspaper
published in the county in which such firm has its principal business office, if
there be a newspaper in such county; and, if not, then in some newspaper pub-
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Mike Rose and Viola Holt were partners in Holt Electric. In June 1980 Holt
Electric incorporated as Holt Electric Co., Inc. but failed to comply with the
notice provisions of article 1302-2.02. In December 1981 Holt retired from
the corporation. Rose continued the business after Holt's retirement and,
approximately one and one half years later, ordered and received goods from
Owen Electric Supply, Inc., but failed to pay for them.
Owen brought a suit on a sworn account against the corporation, Rose
and Holt to recover the price of the goods. The trial court entered judgment
against the corporation, Rose and Holt.243 The trial court held that Holt
was legally obligated to pay for the goods, despite the fact that she did not
buy or receive the goods, because of her failure to properly notify creditors
of the partnership's incorporation as required by article 1302-2.02.244 Holt
appealed the judgment of the trial court.
The appellate court identified the issue on appeal as being whether evi-
dence existed that Owen sold the particular goods on credit to the company
based on the belief that the company believed it was dealing with Holt indi-
vidually and not with the corporate entity.245 The evidence at trial showed
the debt at issue to be a corporate debt, incurred approximately three years
subsequent to the partnership's incorporation and after Holt's departure.
The evidence also showed that once it incorporated, the corporation made
all of its regular payments to Owen on checks in the name of the corpora-
tion, and that Holt never signed any form of individual guaranty. The ap-
pellate court relied on precedent interpreting article 1302-2.02 as having no
basis upon which to impose personal liability where the complaining creditor
did not act in justifiable reliance upon the debtor's individual responsibility
for the corporate debt. 246 The message of the Holt decision is that technical
noncompliance with article 1302-2.02 probably will be insufficient to sustain
the imposition of individual liability upon a shareholder and former partner,
and that a creditor who does desire to continue a relationship with recourse
to the individual shareholders is advised to obtain an individual guaranty
from them.
2. Duties of Officers of Corporation. Grierson v. Parker Energy Partners
1984-1247 involved the duties that a corporation's officers owe to a limited
partnership where the corporation acts as a general partner. William Grier-
son served as president of Parker Energy Technology Corporation, the gen-
eral partner of Parker Energy Partners 1984-1, a California Limited
lished in some adjoining county; provided, however, that such notice shall only
be published one (1) day in each week during the said four (4) weeks. Until such
notice has been so published for the full period above-named, no change shall
take place in the liability of such firm or the members thereof to those dealing
with the firm or its members. It shall be a defense that a claimant had actual





247. 737 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
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Partnership. As general partner, the corporation wrongfully charged
$346,308.34 of expenses to the limited partnership. The partnership sued
the corporation and Grierson for breach of the partnership agreement and
breach of fiduciary duties to the limited partnership. In its suit, the partner-
ship sought an accounting, removal of the corporation as general partner,
return of the limited partnership's books and records, and actual and exem-
plary damages.
Grierson and the corporation never answered the limited partnership's pe-
tition and the trial court entered an interlocutory judgment that prohibited
the corporation from serving as general partner and ordered as account-
ing.248 After the accounting, the trial court awarded approximately
$350,000 in actual damages, $500,000 in exemplary damages, and $45,000 in
attorney's fees against Grierson and the corporation. 249
Grierson appealed the trial court's judgment, claiming that (i) the plead-
ings and evidence lacked sufficient allegations to establish that he owed a
duty to the limited partnership, (ii) the evidence did not support the damage
award, and (iii) the evidence did not support a finding of exemplary dam-
ages. The appellate court agreed and reversed the judgment of the trial
court with respect to Grierson.2 0 The court held that the petition was in-
sufficient to give fair notice to Grierson of the relief sought because it simply
alleged that Grierson failed to force the corporation to resign as general
partner and neglected to transfer the books and records to the newly elected
general partner. To give Grierson fair notice the petition should have al-
leged that Grierson, as president of the corporation, knowingly participated
in the conversion and misapplication of partnership property. Since the peti-
tion failed to allege this, the appellate court sustained Grierson's points of
error.25' The court of appeals affirmed as to the corporation and severed the
judgment as to Grierson, affirming in part and reversing and remanding in
part on the issue of damages only.25 2
In its opinion, the appellate court questioned the circumstances in which
an officer of a corporation would be personally liable without piercing the
corporate veil, noting that a corporate officer owes a fiduciary duty to the
corporation and its shareholders, but generally owes no duty to third per-
sons.25 3 The officer may not, however, knowingly direct or participate in a
tortious or fraudulent act. A corporate officer who knowingly participates in
tortious or fraudulent acts may be held individually liable to a third party
without meeting the requirement of piercing the corporate veil.254 Since the
248. Id. at 376.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 378. The evidence did, however, expose damages of $2,505, which was the cost
of completing the audit of the partnership. Grierson had fair notice of any damages sustained
due to his neglect in not causing the corporation to step down as general partner. The court of
appeals affirmed these damages. Id. at 379.
252. Id.
253. The corporation did not appeal from the trial court's judgment. Id. at 377.
254. This same result does not follow where there is a breach of a corporation contract. In
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breach of a fiduciary duty is a tort under Texas law,25 5 the appellate court
concluded that if Grierson knowingly participated in the breach of the cor-
poration's fiduciary duty to the partnership, he may be liable without pierc-
ing the corporate veil.
256
3. Restrictions on Transfer of Shares. The Texas Business Corporation Act
permits the shareholders of a corporation to impose restrictions upon the
sale or other transfers of stock of the corporation. 257 Consolidated Bearing
& Supply Co. v. First National Bank 258 involved the effectiveness of a certain
bylaw restriction in the face of a pledge of the stock and a foreclosure and
sale of the stock by the pledgee. In 1976, Consolidated, a closely held corpo-
ration, issued 7500 shares of stock to one of its directors. A restrictive bylaw
provision appeared on the face of the stock certificate. This provision re-
quired a shareholder to give other shareholders or the corporation the right
of first refusal in the event the shareholder wished to sell any stock.
In March 1979 the director borrowed $300,000 from First National Bank
at Lubbock and pledged the Consolidated stock as security for the loan.
Shortly thereafter the director died without fully satisfying his obligation
with the bank. The bank unsuccessfully attempted to collect the unpaid bal-
ance of the loan and, thereafter, acquired the 7500 pledged shares of consoli-
dated stock by a sheriff's sale.
In 1983 Consolidated and two of its shareholders filed suit seeking a de-
claratory judgment that the pledge of the restricted stock by the director,
and the resulting foreclosure and sale, were null and void, and that title to
the stock remained in Consolidated. In the alternative Consolidated alleged
that the shares remained subject to the restrictions on the face of the stock
certificates in that the shares belonged in a constructive trust. The trial
court entered judgment in favor of the bank. 259 Consolidated and its share-
holders appealed.
On appeal Consolidated claimed (i) that the bank had or should have had
knowledge of the director's pledge of the stock and (ii) that the bank's subse-
quent purchase of the stock at the sheriff's sale violated the bylaw restriction
that gave the other shareholders a right of first refusal. The appellate court
looked to precedent and concluded that stock restrictions are not looked
upon with favor and generally are construed narrowly, noting that restric-
tions of this type generally do not apply to a transfer that occurs through an
involuntary sale or by operation of law unless a special provision in the re-
striction states otherwise.260 The court also took notice of the general recog-
such a situation the officer will not incur personal liability. Barclay v. Johnson, 686 S.W.2d
334, 336-37 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ).
255. Douglas v. Aztec Petroleum Corp., 695 S.W.2d 312, 318 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1985, no
writ).
256. 737 S.W.2d at 377.
257. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2-22, § D(4) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
258. 720 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1986, no writ).
259. Id.at 648.
260. Id. at 650. For example, the court cited Earthman's, Inc. v. Earthman, 526 S.W.2d
192 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ), where the court did not permit a
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nition that transfer restrictions ordinarily apply only to bona fide sales and
not to transfers pursuant to foreclosure proceedings. 261 The appellate court
concluded that the pledge of stock to the bank and the bank's subsequent
purchase of the stock at the sheriff's sale did not violate the bylaw
restriction. 262
4. Piercing the Corporate Veil. As in previous Surveys, piercing the corpo-
rate veil has continued to be a fruitful ground for litigation during the Sur-
vey period. In Valdes v. Leisure Resource Group, Inc. 263 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed a creditor's attempt to hold
a parent company and a lender individually liable for the debts of a subsidi-
ary company based on the corporate alter ego theory. In 1978 United Ser-
vice Corporation (USC), a wholly owned subsidiary of Capitol Savings &
Loan (Capitol), sold condominium units located in Texas to Leisure Re-
source Group (LRG) of Austin, Texas who wanted the units to use in its
vacation time-share business. USC retained deeds of trust pertaining to the
units and agreed to purchase the credit contracts that resulted from the sale
of time-share intervals in the units. This purchase provided LRG enough
cash to meet its current operating expenses.
In 1980 LRG experienced cash flow problems. In March 1981 LRG em-
ployed two consultants to aid in the organization of its business undertak-
ings. The consultants reported the LRG needed a cash infusion in order to
maintain business as usual. USC, although hesitant to advance LRG addi-
tional funds, agreed to loan $700,000 to LRG in an effort to prevent loss of
USC's collateral in the event of bankruptcy. USC knew that the cash from
this loan would be used for necessary business expenditures, but it did not
know that LRG secretly had earmarked $210,000 as a fee for the
consultants.
In July 1981 the president of LRG contractually agreed to purchase from
Valdes and his company, IKK, a hotel in Cancun, Mexico, that he intended
to convert into 55 condominium units. LRG gave Valdes and IKK promis-
sory notes totalling approximately $8,000,000 as payment for the hotel.
Shortly thereafter Capitol and USC discovered that LRG's president fraudu-
lently pledged unenforceable credit contracts to USC as security for addi-
tional loans. In October 1981, Capitol and USC called in all of LRG's loans
and proceeded to foreclose on the president's LRG stock that served as se-
curity for the loans. Despite several attempts to work things out, problems
continued to worsen. Shortly thereafter LRG terminated its contract with
IKK.
corporation to buy stock that a divorce action had awarded to a shareholder's wife, despite the
fact that such a transfer restriction appeared in its articles of incorporation. Earthman's, 526
S.W.2d at 202, cited in Consolidated, 720 S.W.2d at 650-51.
261. Consolidated, 720 S.W.2d at 651, citing Annotation, Construction and Application of
Provisions of Articles, Bylaws, Statutes or Agreements Restricting Alienation or Transfer of Cor-
porate Stock, 2 A.L.R.2d 745, 754-56 (1948).
262. Id.
263. 810 F.2d 1345 (5th Cir. 1987).
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IKK filed an action in federal district court against Capitol, USC, and
LRG seeking recovery for breach of contract and several other causes of
action including a claim that Capitol, USC, and LRG fraudulently induced
IKK to surrender valuable rights in the promissory notes owed to it by
LRG. One day prior to the date of the trial the district court granted Capi-
tol, USC, and LRG's motion for summary judgment on the breach of con-
tract issue based on its conclusion that the November contract was illegal
and unenforceable under Mexican law.264
The district court submitted two issues to the jury: (i) whether Capitol,
USG or LRG fraudulently induced IKK to surrender its rights in the prom-
issory notes, and (ii) whether IKK was the corporate alter ego of Capitol or
USC. The jury found in favor of IKK on both issues and awarded IKK
$6,600,000 in actual damages. The jury also assessed $100,000 in exemplary
damages against Capitol, USC, and LRG, found each lender to be the alter
ego of LRG, and found Capitol and USC jointly liable for LRG's fraudulent
conduct. 265
On appeal the Fifth Circuit addressed, among other things, the issue of
alter ego status and applied the test set forth by the Texas Supreme Court in
Castleberry v. Branscum.266 In Castleberry the supreme court held that the
proper test to be applied in alter ego cases is whether there is such unity
between a corporation and another person or entity that the separateness of
the corporation has ceased and holding only the corporation liable would be
unfair. The court held that the unfairness test in alter ego cases is based on
the fact that the dominant shareholder or parent company is the party that
should be held legally responsible for creating the subservient company's
debts because it controls the subservient company. 267 After analyzing appli-
cable precedent, the Fifth Circuit predicted that Texas courts would not al-
ways require full and unfettered ownership of the corporation whose veil the
complainant seeks to pierce based on the alter ego theory. In the absence of
such a conclusion, however, the court would require especially persuasive
evidence of control.268 Absent full ownership or ownership of the allegedly
controlled entity, the court required other indicia of the supplantation of the
autonomy of the subservient corporation by the actions of the allegedly dom-
inant company before imposing alter ego liability.269
The court held that the Interim Operating Agreement did not evidence
that Capitol and USG possessed ownership of LRG. 270 The appellate court
also found no evidence indicating that LRG had failed to comport with cor-
porate formalities; hold shareholder or director meetings; keep separate cor-
porate and financial records from its lenders; commingle the property of
LRG and the lenders; have identical corporate officers, business transactions
264. Id. at 1348.
265. Id. at 1349.
266. 721 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1986).
267. Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 272.
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or offices with its lenders; or generate confusion among creditors with re-
spect to with whom they were dealing.271 Finally, the court concluded that
objective criteria displaying control and alter ego status were absent.272 The
appellate court also noted that in Lucas v. Texas Industries273 these charac-
teristics did not exist and therefore the Texas Supreme Court did not find
the parent company to be the alter ego of its subsidiary. 274 Accordingly, the
Valdes court held that the alter ego theory was inapplicable.
Another example of an attempt to impose the alter ego theory is Robbins
v. Robbins.275 Robbins arose from a suit that a widow brought against her
husband's six children from a prior marriage in order to determine the status
of 153,150 shares of stock owned by the husband as separate property before
his death. Ernestlene and Harvey Robbins became husband and wife on
June 10, 1964. At this time Mr. Robbins owned the majority of the stock of
Lakeside Telephone Company (Lakeside). In January 1983 Mr. Robbins
traded his shares of Lakeside stock for 153,150 common shares of Continen-
tal Telecom, Inc. (Contel). Mr. Robbins died in December 1983.
Ms. Robbins initiated a suit pursuant to the Texas Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act 276 presenting an alter ego theory of liability characterizing
Lakeside as the alter ego of Mr. Robbins; thus, the Lakeside stock would be
community property. The trial court ruled in favor of Ms. Robbins and
awarded her 75,449.73 shares of the Contel stock, which represented her
community interest in the originally acquired, now traded Lakeside stock.277
The estate appealed the trial court's judgment, contending that there was no
evidence or insufficient evidence to support the trial court's alter ego finding.
The appellate court reviewed the teaching of Castleberry and concluded
that alter ego applies when there is such unity between a corporation and an
individual that the separateness of the corporation has ceased and holding
only the dominant corporation liable would be unfair.278 Although the
court could not point to any case using the alter ego theory to determine the
status of a decedent's property, it concluded that the rules of law concerning
the alter ego theory apply in such situations.279
The court applied the rule that it will not use the alter ego theory to disre-
gard the corporation unless: (i) it appears that the unity outweighs the cor-
poration's individuality; and (ii) due to the facts of the case, adherence to the
fictitious separate existence would promote injustice. 280 The court also
noted that in the past Texas courts have been reluctant to pierce the corpo-
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. 696 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. 1984).
274. Valdes, 810 F.2d at 1354.
275. 727 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1987, no writ).
276. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 37.001-.004, .006-.011 (Vernon 1986),
§ 37.005 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
277. Robbins, 727 S.W.2d at 744.
278. Id. at 745.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 746.
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rate veil and find the individual personally liable. 281 The court stated that
compelling circumstances generally were necessary before a Texas court
would hold a chief executive officer or controlling stockholder personally
liable.282 Mere domination of the business of the corporation by a stock-
holder will not, standing alone, require personal liability, nor will the mere
unification of financial interests require a disregard of the corporation as an
entity.28
3
The appellate court next considered the factual sufficiency of the evidence
upon which the trial court based its finding of alter ego liability.28 4 Regard-
ing the no evidence point, the appellate court reviewed the trial court's find-
ings of fact and concluded that same evidence did in fact serve to support the
trial court's findings that Lakeside was the alter ego of Mr. Robbins. 285 The
majority of the evidence, however, supported the proposition that Lakeside
and Mr. Robins maintained separate existences. 28 6 The appellate court
found the evidence as reported in the record factually insufficient to establish
a unity between Lakeside and Mr. Robbins and a resulting cessation of sepa-
rate corporate existence. 28 7 The appellate court thus reversed the judgment
of the trial court and remanded the cause for a new trial.288
Francis v. Beaudry289 presented the issue of piercing the corporate veil in
another unusual context. In that case, a deceased stockholder's estate
brought an action against the other stockholders as well as the directors of
the corporation to recoup the value of the deceased shareholder's holdings in
the corporation as of the date of his death. In September 1981 Reeves, Fran-
cis, and Edwards incorporated Columbia Oilfield Equipment, Inc. The three
parties were to be shareholders in the corporation in equal proportions. The
parties drafted and executed the requisite documents of incorporation and
the corporation issued equal shares of stock to Reeves, Francis, and Ed-
wards as shareholders. None of these shareholders, however, contributed
any funds to the corporation as consideration for the shares of stock as re-
quired under Texas law prior to the corporation's commencement of busi-
281. Id. citing, Aztec Management & Inv. Co. v. McKenzie, 709 S.W.2d 237, 239 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ); Torregrossa v. Szelc, 603 S.W.2d 803, 804 (Tex. 1980);
Bell Oil & Gas Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 431 S.W.2d 336, 340 (Tex. 1968); Place Corp. v.
Jackson, 155 Tex. 179, 284 S.W.2d 340, 351 (1955).
282. Robbins, 727 S.W.2d at 746.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 747.
286. Id. The court recited the following evidence that Lakeside and Harvey were distinct
and separate entities: (1) Lakeside was operated as a corporation and the directors observed
corporate formalities; (2) Lakeside's assets were never intermingled with Harvey's individual
assets; (3) the only item of personal services or goods furnished to Harvey by Lakeside was an
automobile used at least partly for business purposes; (4) all of the assets used in the business
were owned by Lakeside; (5) Harvey's individual bank accounts and Lakeside's corporate bank
accounts were kept separately and were never intermixed; (6) the corporation paid its own
taxes and had a tax number separate from Harvey's social security number; and (7) Lakeside
employees were corporate employees, not employees of Harvey. Id.
287. Id
288. Id.
289. 733 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
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ness. 290 Nevertheless, the parties undertook operation of the business in the
name of the corporation. Reeves served as president of the corporation from
the date of incorporation until his death in May 1982 and managed the ma-
jority of the corporation's activities.
The problems started after Reeves' death, when Francis and Edwards at-
tempted to "wind up" the business. This winding up process basically in-
volved Francis and Edwards settling the corporation's affairs and paying the
corporation's creditors. During this process the two men also managed to
buy themselves cars in their individual names out of business funds and each
personally received payments from the sale of certain assets of the business.
In early 1984 Edwards and Francis sold and distributed the remaining com-
pany assets to themselves in the sum of approximately $44,000 to Francis
and $47,000 to Edwards, but they never formally dissolved the corporate
shell.
Beaudry, the administrator of Reeves' estate, brought an action against
Francis and Edwards to recover Reeves' one-third interest in the corporation
valued as of the date of Reeves death. Beaudry alleged that following
Reeves' death Francis and Edwards ran the business for their own personal
benefit. Beaudry's pleadings also stated that Francis' and Edwards' identi-
ties and the corporation's identities were united and that the corporation was
their alter ego. Beaudry based his alter ego allegation on the grounds that
Francis and Beaudry utilized the corporation only as a conduit for their
personal businesses and as a means to injure those who dealt with it.
Beaudry raised the following facts in support of his allegations:
(i) Francis and Edwards owned two-thirds of the corporation's outstanding
stock, (ii) they were the sole directors of the corporation and served as its
officers, and (iii) they ignored the corporation's separate existence by failing
to hold regular directors and shareholders meetings, failing to acquire writ-
ten consents to corporate actions, and by failing to keep corporate records
other than the corporate formation documents. Through their control of the
corporation, Beaudry asserted, Francis and Edwards obtained possession of
the whole of the assets of the business and appropriated these assets for their
own personal use, thereby depriving the estate of its undivided one-third
interest in the corporation.
The trial court found the value of Reeves' interest on the date of his death
to be approximately $50,000 and that, after that date, Francis and Edwards
(i) continuously operated the corporation for their own personal benefit,
(ii) wound up the affairs of the business and distributed the assets to them-
selves, and (iii) used the form of a corporation to serve solely their individual
interests.291 The trial court also termed the corporation as the alter ego of
Francis and Edwards and awarded the estate its $50,000 of damages, to-
gether with attorneys' fees and costs. 292 Francis alone appealed the judg-
ment of the trial court.
290. TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT. ANN. art. 3.05 (Vernon 1980).




In the appellate court Francis raised five related points of error. First,
Francis characterized Beaudry's claim as a stockholder's derivative action
and argued that Beaudry did not comply with the Texas statutory require-
ments for such suits. Second, Francis argued that Beaudry was not legally
entitled to recover one-third of the value of the corporation at the time of
Reeves' death as an asset of the estate. Third, Francis argued that the alter
ego theory did not apply to his type of case.
The appellate court interpreted the essence of Francis' points of errors to
be that the trial court erred in permitting Beaudry to pierce the corporate
veil and recover directly against Francis and Edwards since the case in-
volved assets of a corporation. 293 This argument had superficial appeal be-
cause of the presumed existence of a corporate veil that generally prevents a
stockholder from suing a director or officer for breach of a duty to the corpo-
ration. Generally the right to bring suit for such a breach belongs to the
corporation since the corporation sustains the primary injury.
The appellate court, while agreeing in principle with Francis' argument,
diligently applied the teaching of Castleberry stating that courts will not ad-
here to the corporate fiction and will find shareholders, officers, and direc-
tors personally liable when these parties take advantage of the corporate
privilege. 294 The appellate court held that Beaudry did not need to bring the
suit in the form of a shareholder's derivative suit where the evidence suffi-
ciently supported piercing the corporate veil. 29 5 The court held Francis to
be personally liable. 296 The appellate court applied the rationale behind the
alter ego theory, namely, that if the shareholders themselves ignore the sepa-
rate existence of the corporation, the law will ignore it as well in order to
prevent injury to individual and corporate creditors.297
The court noted that a second theory, known as "denuding the corpora-
tion," also supported Beaudry's right to bring his claim directly against
Francis and Edwards, as well as the piercing the corporate veil theory, that
would permit Beaudry to recover the value of one-third of the corporate
assets belonging to Reeves' estate. 298 The appellate court also rejected Fran-
cis' argument that the estate may not obtain the corporation's assets due to
the failure of the corporation to formally dissolve.299 The court held that
the estate could trace the assets of the denuded corporation to the two other
owners, notwithstanding the absence of a formal dissolution.3 °
293. Id.




298. Id. The "denuding the corporation" theory had its roots in Texas in World Broad-
casting System, Inc. v. Bass, 160 Tex. 1261, 328 S.W.2d 863, 864 (1959) and, the Texas
Supreme Court recently approved the theory in Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 271 n. 1. In World
Broadcasting System shareholders sold the entire assets of a corporation and kept the resulting
income for their own personal benefit. The Texas Supreme Court found the corporation was
denuded of its assets and held the shareholders personally liable to the corporation's creditors
up to the sum of the funds they obtained. 328 S.W.2d at 864.
299. Francis, 733 S.W.2d at 335.
300. Id.
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Francis' final argument stated that the alter ego theory did not apply to
his case because Beaudry did not allege that the shareholders used the corpo-
ration as a sham. The court followed Castleberry and did not agree with this
argument because of the separate and distinct nature of the causes of action
for the alter ego theory and the theory based on a sham to perpetuate a
fraud.30 1
A case of first impression regarding whether the right to assert an alter
ego theory belongs to the corporation or merely to its shareholders and third
parties arose in S.. Acquisitions, Inc. v. Eastway Delivery Service, Inc. 302 S.I.
Acquisitions involved a shipper (S.I.A.) that entered into a service contract in
1984 with Eastway, a delivery service company. Shortly thereafter in March
1985 S.I.A. became a delinquent debtor failing to pay Eastway as stated in
their contract. S.I.A. eventually sent two partial payments to Eastway from
an account that Abel Furniture & Equipment Co., Inc. (Abel) possessed. 303
Eastway subsequently continued to serve S.I.A. but did not receive any addi-
tional payments.
In August 1985 Eastway filed a state court action against S.I.A., Abel, and
TPO, Inc. demanding the remaining payments contractually due as well as
damages. The action also named Thomas P. O'Donnell, the registered agent
for all of the above-mentioned corporations, as a defendant. Eastway
claimed liability from S.I.A. based on their contract and in turn from Abel,
TPO, and O'Donnell because, Eastway argued, they completely controlled
S.I.A.304 Shortly thereafter S.I.A. filed a voluntary petition for relief under
chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. 30 5 Eastway countered
S.I.A.'s petition for bankruptcy by severing S.I.A. from its state court action
due to the fact that section 362(a)(1) of title 11 served as an automatic stay
with respect to the claim against S.I.A. 306
Subsequently, Eastway delivered written interrogatories to Abel, TPO,
301. Id.
302. 817 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1987).
303. Both remittances displayed the payor's name that appeared stamped upon the check.
The first check issued in the name of Abel and the second in the name of S.I.A. Id. at 1144
n. I.
304. Specifically, Eastway alleged:
that Defendant S.I.A. and Defendant ABEL are in fact owned and controlled by
Defendant TPO, INC ..... that Defendants TPO, INC., S.I.A. and ABEL are
liable on the contract sued upon herein for the reason that S.I.A. and ABEL are
but conduits by which the parent corporation, TPO, INC. does business, and
that S.I.A. and ABEL operate functionally as arms or departments of the De-
fendant TPO, INC. This arrangement is used merely as a cloak to conceal
fraud, wrongs, and injustice, and to insulate TPO, INC. from legal and financial
responsibility for wrongs committed by S.I.A. and other subsidiaries... [A]nd
that Defendants S.I.A., ABEL, and TPO, INC. are but alter egos for the per-
sonal business affairs of Defendant THOMAS P. O'DONNELL's control and
domination of Defendants S.I.A., ABEL, and TPO, INC. exists to the extent
that said purported corporations' actions are in substance the actions of Defend-
ant THOMAS P. O'DONNELL.
Id.
305. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1983).
306. See Wedgeworth v. Fibreboard Corp., 706 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1983) (one filing
bankruptcy may be severed from a state court action to evade a stay violation).
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and O'Donnell, the non-bankrupt defendants in the state court action, that
questioned the financial and control connections between the three corpora-
tions and O'Donnell. S.I.A. then filed a motion to show cause in the bank-
ruptcy court claiming that it would be improper to hold Eastway in
contempt based on an alleged violation of the automatic stay provisions.
The bankruptcy court considered whether the automatic stay provision pre-
vented further actions being taken against the non-bankrupt defendants
while in state court based on piercing the corporate veil of S.I.A., the debtor.
The bankruptcy court denied S.I.A.'s motion, concluding that (i) Eastway's
alter ego claim did not constitute a claim that S.I.A. or a trustee in bank-
ruptcy under 11 U.S.C. section 544 could assert 307 and (ii) the alter ego
cause of action did not constitute property for purposes of determining
S.I.A.'s bankruptcy estate since neither S.I.A. nor the trustee could bring an
alter ego cause of action. 30 8 The court concluded that the automatic stay
provisions of section 362 did not apply to Eastway's claim against Abel,
TPO, and O'Donnell. 309 S.I.A. appealed the judgment to the district court,
which affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy court without issuing an opin-
ion. 310 S.I.A. then filed an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit.
In analyzing the issue, the Fifth Circuit noted that a section 362(a)(1) stay
generally applies solely to prevent claims against a debtor, but that some
courts have permitted such a stay to prohibit claims against non-bankrupt
codefendants where the two parties involved are found in reality to be one
entity or to have a solitary interest. 311 Relying on precedent in the circuit,
the Fifth Circuit stated the guiding principles to be that (i) a section
362(a)(3) stay pertains to a state or federal claim that belongs to the debtor,
(ii) such a stay pertains to a claim that attempts to recover estate property
where this property is under the control of a person or entity other than the
debtor himself, and (iii) when employing this rule, courts should remember
the Bankruptcy Code's general guidelines of obtaining and preserving the
debtor's assets and of guaranteeing equal distribution of these assets to credi-
tors who are in similar situations.312
The issue on appeal concerned whether once a debtor files his bankruptcy
petition, section 362 automatically stays a state court suit based solely on the
theory that the named defendants actually control the bankrupt debtor and
are thereby responsible for the debtor's debts. 313 The Fifth Circuit reviewed
307. In re S.I. Acquisition, Inc., 58 B.R. 454, 462 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1986). See 11 U.S.C.
§ 544 (1983).
308. S.L Acquisition, 58 B.R. at 459.
309. Id. at 462. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1983).
310. 817 F.2d at 1145.
311. Id. at 1148. See Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Butler, 803 F.2d 61, 65 (2d
Cir. 1986); In re Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 33 B.R. 254, 263-64 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); In
re Old Orchard Inv. Co., 31 B.R. 599, 603 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1983); In re Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 26 B.R. 405, 410 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Oter Mills, Inc., 25 B.R. 1018,
1020-21 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1982).
312. S. Acquisition, 817 F.2d at 1150 (citing In re Mortgage America, 714 F.2d 1266 (5th
Cir. 1983)).
313. S.. Acquisition, 817 F.2d at 1150.
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Texas law regarding the alter ego remedy and concluded that the remedy
appeared to be available to all creditors of a corporation provided the credi-
tors establish the unification of the corporation and its controller.3 14 The
court stated that the alter ego theory did not depend upon a certain credi-
tor's transactions with or dependence upon the person in actual control, nor
did it depend upon the plaintiff's ability to show fraud on the part of a par-
ticular creditor. 315
The court characterized the issue of whether a corporation could bring an
alter ego cause of action against itself as very important to its decision. 316
Although the court found no controlling precedent on point, it stated that
the generally accepted policy of Texas alter ego law is that the person in
control who abused the corporate form will be responsible for the corpora-
tion's debts. 317 The court believed the corporation had a separate existence,
and that therefore inconsistency did not prevent the corporation from pierc-
ing its own corporate veil and holding responsible those people who abused
the corporation in order to meet its corporate debts.318 The court found
support for this conclusion in Castleberry, to the effect that a remedy based
on the alter ego theory, the doctrine of trust fund, and the theory of denud-
ing the corporation (the latter two being stayable) are like theories of recov-
ery that seek to cure the problems of abuse of the corporate form.319
The Fifth Circuit also concluded that, while the debtor corporation's cred-
itors usually assert a claim founded on the alter ego theory, this did not
impair the conclusion that "nothing in Texas law prohibits a corporation
from asserting on its own an action based on alter ego. . .-320 Furthermore,
the court determined the rationale for the remedy also supports this conclu-
sion. 32' The court concluded that Eastway's cause of action based on the
alter ego theory belonged to S.I.A. and, therefore, this claim constituted es-
tate property within the meaning of section 541(a)(1).3 22 The court held
that the automatic stay applied to Eastway's state claim and the decisions of
the bankruptcy court and district court denying the motion to show cause
filed by S.I.A. Thus, the court remanded the case for further proceedings. 323
314. Id. at 1152, citing Valdes v. Leisure Resource Group, Inc., 810 F.2d 1345, 1352-54
(5th Cir. 1987).
315. S.. Acquisition, 817 F.2d at 1152 (citing Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 272-73 and Ed-
wards Co. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., 730 F.2d 977, 982-84 (5th Cir. 1984)).
316. S.. Acquisition, 817 F.2d at 1152.
317. Id. (citing Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 272, and Valdes v. Leisure Resource Group,
Inc., 810 F.2d 1345, 1352-54 (5th Cir. 1987) (discussing Texas law on alter ego and holding
that this doctrine applies to find controlling entity accountable for subservient company's obli-
gations since controlling entity created debts)).
318. S.. Acquisition, 817 F.2d at 1152. The court noted that another court reached the
identical conclusion when interpreting Nevada alter ego law, which is the same as Texas alter
ego law, on the grounds that the corporation possesses a separate legal interest of its own in
assuring that it can meet its obligations to its creditors. Id. at 1152-53. See In re Western
World Funding, Inc., 52 B.R. 743, 783 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1985).
319. S.L Acquisition, 817 F.2d at 1153 (citing Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 271 n.l).
320. S.. Acquisition, 817 F.2d at 1153.
321. Id.
322. Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1982).
323. S.. Acquisition, 817 F.2d at 1153.
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1. Contract in Violation of Securities Laws. Texas courts aroused national
attention by upholding the largest civil damages award in history, $8.53 bil-
lion, in Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co. 324 Texaco involved a claim against Tex-
aco for tortious interference with a stock purchase-merger agreement
between Pennzoil and Getty Oil Company, Sarah C. Getty Trust, and the J.
Paul Getty Museum (the "Getty Entities"), resulting in a jury award of
$7.53 billion of actual damages and $3 billion of punitive damages to
Pennzoil. Texaco appealed the jury award to the First District Court of
Appeals characterizing the stock purchase-merger agreement as void be-
cause it violated SEC Rule lOb-13,325 which states that upon public an-
nouncement of a tender offer, the offeror may not acquire stock of the target
company, unless the acquisition is made by means of the tender offer, for the
duration of the open offer.326 Texaco claimed that any contractual agree-
ment violating the SEC rule had no effect.
Texaco argued that Pennzoil contracted (i) to buy at once the J. Paul
Getty Museum's shares of Getty Oil Company stock and (ii) at a later date
to buy the public shares at a higher price than that offered in the tender offer
while the tender offer remained open. Texaco argued this resulted in a per se
violation of the SEC rule, regardless of whether any shareholders received a
windfall from the outside purchase. While the purpose of the SEC rule is
not to protect a party such as Texaco; nonetheless, Texaco claimed that
since Pennzoil's agreement violated the SEC rule, it became void and there-
fore could not support a cause of action for tortious interference. The appel-
late court concluded, however, that the SEC rule's express exemption
provision argues against the implication that all violations of the rule un-
questionably render the transaction void.327 Assuming the transaction at
best then would be voidable, Texaco had no standing to argue the violation
of the rule.328 The appellate court upheld the trial court's judgment, but
required a $2 billion dollar remittitur.329 The Texas Supreme Court surpris-
ingly refused the writ filed on the case on the grounds of no reversible error.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the case but the
parties settled out of court for $3 billion.
2. Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act Not Applicable to the Sale of Securi-
ties. In a case of first impression, the Texas Supreme Court ruled in E.F
Hutton & Co. v. Youngblood 330 that the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices
Act ("DTPA")331 does not apply to the sale of securities. 332 Youngblood
324. 729 S.W.2d 768, 866 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1087, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
325. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1985).
326. Id.; see Texaco, 729 S.W.2d at 806.
327. Id.
328. Id. The court declined to speculate on whether a party with standing could have
successfully asserted a violation of the SEC rule. Id. at 806-07.
329. Id.
330. 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 508 (June 24, 1987).
331. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41-.826 (Vernon 1987).
332. 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 509.
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involved a brokerage firm that advised a customer regarding the tax conse-
quences of withdrawing money from a retirement fund and reinvesting the
money in one of the brokerage firm's bond funds. The brokerage firm's ad-
vice was erroneous and the customer incurred a substantial tax liability. The
customer, brought an action under the both the DTPA, the Texas Securities
Act (the TSA) 3 3 3 and common law fraud to recover his liability. The trial
court and the appellate court held in favor of the customer on the DTPA
issue. 3 34 The brokerage firm appealed to the Texas Supreme Court.
The court analyzed the legislative intent as evidence by the differences
between the DTPA and the TSA and concluded that it would be inconsistent
to hold the brokerage firm liable under both.335 The key to the court's anal-
ysis was its determination that the DTPA essentially is a strict liability stat-
ute, while the TSA permits a due diligence defense. 336 Concluding that the
due diligence defense would be illusory if the same conduct was actionable
under a strict liability theory, the supreme court reversed the lower courts
and remanded the case for consideration of the TSA and common law theo-
ries of liability. 337 It is interesting to note that eight of nine jurisdictions that
have addressed the issue have concluded that securities transactions are
outside of the scope of their DTPA analogues. 338 Only Arizona has reached
the opposite result. 339
3. Enforcement of 1934 Act Arbitration Agreements. In Shear-
son/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,340 the United States Supreme
court held that the Federal Arbitration Act requires the enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate claims brought under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934341 and that its holding was to be applied retroactively. 342
333. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 581-1 to -39 (Vernon 1964 & Vernon Supp. 1988).
334. 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 508-09.
335. Id. at 509.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. See In re Catanella & E.F. Hutton & Co. Sec. Litig., 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1439 (E.D.
Pa. 1984) (applying New Jersey law); Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667, 675
(N.D. Ga. 1983); Russell v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 510 A.2d 972, 977 (Conn. 1986); Cabot
Corp. v. Baddour, 477 N.E.2d 399, 402 (Mass. 1985); Skinner v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 333
S.E.2d 236, 241 (N.C. 1985); State v. Piedmont Funding Corp., 382 A.2d 819, 822 (R.I. 1978);
South Carolina ex rel. McLeod v. Rhoades, 267 S.E.2d 539, 541 (S.C. 1980); Kittilson v. Ford,
595 P.2d 944, 948 (1979), aff'd; 608 P.2d 264 (Wash. 1980).
339. 15 U.S.C. §§ 75a-78kk (1982 & Supp. 1 1983).
340. 107 S. Ct. 2332, 96 L. Ed. 2d 185 (1987).
341. 15 U.S.C. §§ 75a-78kk (1982 & Supp. 1 1983).
342. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2343, 96 L. Ed. 2d at 201.
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